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ABSTRACT 
This study attempts to determine if South Africa was actively attempting to boost its 
soft power or symbolic power during the country’s bid to host the Fifa 2010 World 
Cup.  Preceding works dealing with mega-events identified a number of potential 
benefits to the hosting nation.  Some of these benefits include opportunities for 
development (sport and socio-economic), nation building, urban regeneration, and 
marketing.  Previous works have focused a great deal on economic and nation 
building aspects of mega-events.  The marketing possibility for a host to develop as a 
tourist destination has also enjoyed some focus.  
 
There also exists a large amount of literature dealing with power – its nature, 
resources and types.  There is for instance structural and relational power while, in the 
traditional sense, wealth and military might may be seen as power resources.  
However, the importance and maintenance of soft power – or symbolic or co-optive 
power, as defined in this study – has been greatly overshadowed by the traditional 
ideas of power and as a result, neglected by International Relations scholars.    
 
This study links the marketing potential of mega-events with the deployment of soft 
power.  The case study specifically deals with South Africa’s World Cup bid as a 
marketing forum for enhancing the country’s soft power.  For such an analysis it is 
necessary to investigate South Africa’s diplomatic status, global position, relationship 
with the North and South, and power resources.  The importance of soft power being 
essential to South Africa’s specific situation, global position and future, is also 
investigated. 
 
Using the bid for the 2010 World Cup, this study concludes that South Africa was 
indeed projecting specifically chosen images of the country with the intention of 
enhancing the country’s soft power.  It is furthermore argued that these images are 
both a reflection and in support of South Africa’s foreign policy and emerging middle 
power position.   
 
 
 
 ii
OPSOMMING 
Hierdie studie poog om vas te stel of Suid Afrika doelgerig probeer het om die land se 
sagte mag te versterk tydens die Fifa 2010 Wêreldbekerbod.  Vorige studies oor 
grootskaalse gebeurtenisse meen dat dit sekere potensieële voordele inhou vir die 
gasheer.  Dit sluit in geleenthede vir ontwikkeling (sport en sosio-ekonomies), nasie-
bou, en  stedelike herlewing en bemarking.  Vorige werke het ook meerendeels 
gefokus op die ekonomiese en nasie-bou aspekte van grootskaalse gebeurtenisse.  Die 
bemarkingsvoordele wat dit inhou vir die gasheer se toerismebedryf is ook gereeld 
vehandel.   
 
Daar bestaan ook vele geskrewe werke oor mag.  Verskillende bronne van mag is 
ondermeer ‘n gewilde onderwerp.  Daar is byvoorbeeld strukturele mag en 
verhoudings mag.  Tradisioneel word militêre en ekonomiese vermoëns gesien as 
bronne van mag.  Die belangrikheid van sagte mag of simboliese mag, soos dit in 
hierdie studie gedefinieër word, is egter tot ‘n groot mate oorskadu deur traditionele 
idees van mag.  Daardeur het Internasionale Betrekkinge akademici dit ook tot ‘n 
mate afgeskeep.   
 
Hierdie studie illustreer die bemarkingspotentiaal wat grootskaalse gebeurtenisse 
inhou vir sagte mag.  Die gevallestudie handel spesifiek oor Suid Afrika se 2010 bod 
as ‘n potentieële bemarkingsforum vir die bevordering van die land se sagte mag.  Die 
analise het vereis dat Suid Afrika se diplomatieke status, globale posisie, verhouding 
met die Noorde en Suide, en bronne van mag behandel word.  Die belangrikheid van 
sagte mag vir Suid Afrika se toekoms word ook aangespreek.   
 
Die gevolgtrekking is dat Suid Afrika wel gepoog het om sekere gekose beelde na die 
buiteland te projekteer.  Die spesifieke doel met die beelde was om die land se sagte 
mag uit te brei.  ‘n Verdere bevinding is dat die beelde gelyktydig Suid Afrika se 
buitelandse beleid en ontluikende middel magsposisie gereflekteer het. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Sport is probably the most effective means of communication in the modern world, bypassing both 
verbal and written communication and reaching directly out to billions of people worldwide”  
– President Nelson Mandela, 1996 (Beck, 2004:77). 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
Modern sport has an inescapable influence on the domestic and foreign policies of all 
governments.  Invariably domestic and foreign policies influence sport.  No government can 
deny these facts since “modern sport represents a major political, economic, social and 
cultural force in today’s world” (Beck, 2004: 90).  International Relations scholars have 
recognised the importance of sport to their field of study.  Although this has been neglected 
in the past it has changed in recent years.  The political, social and economic dimensions of 
mega sporting events and sport associations are some sports-related areas that have enjoyed 
growing attention. 
 
Major sporting events are especially analysed in terms of the potential benefits they hold, or 
in terms of the benefits their adherents claim to possess.  The more important benefits are 
associated with economic gain, nation building, socio-economic development, and marketing 
potential (Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Gratton & Taylor, 2000; Hiller, 2000).  The 
potential benefit that is considered key to this study is the potential of mega sporting events 
to enhance the international prestige of the host nation.  Levermore (2004: 21) stated that 
beside United Nations membership, membership of international sports associations is the 
clear signal that a country is recognised by the international community. This is even more 
relevant if a state is awarded the right to host mega sports events.  South Korea’s hosting of 
the 1988 Olympic Games is one such example (Buzo, 2002: 173).  It had shown that the 
international community acknowledged that South Korea gained significant diplomatic and 
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economic power in the international system, as well as the Asian region.  Herein lie the 
potential benefits for a country’s soft power.  
  
This study will view soft power as a non-coercive means to either establish cooperation, or to 
achieve own or collective gain, by means of attractive and legitimate authority and power, as 
well as other intangible aspects such as culture, ideology and institutions1.  Furthermore, it 
will become evident that greater international prestige and the boosting of soft power are 
closely dependent on one another.  It is argued that states are actively attempting to enhance 
their international prestige by bidding and hosting mega sporting events.  One of the first 
well-known examples where a state used a major sporting event to conduct foreign policy 
and to further its international prestige is Nazi Germany’s hosting of the 1936 Berlin 
Olympics (Roche, 18, 104).  It is even more relevant when considering Hall’s (1994: 160) 
argument that mega-events may strengthen “dominant ideologies or further individual 
interests, legitimise hegemonic relationships and change the meaning and structure of place”.  
Some of these are applicable to Nazi objectives in the 1930s.  
 
Black & Van der Westhuizen (2004) argue that governments also make use of mega sporting 
events to “signal” to the international community the changes and developments that the 
country has undergone.  This was especially the case during Malaysia’s hosting of the 1998 
Commonwealth Games.  Silk (2001: 286) said, among other goals, the Malaysian 
government intended to “showcase” itself as a developed country.  It is of course a status that 
Malaysia desperately wanted to acquire and maintain.  Malaysia is of course a developing 
country.  However, the attempt to showcase itself as developed is based on the assumption 
that it would raise Malaysia’s international prestige, among other potential benefits.     
 
Cornelissen (2004a & 2004b) argues that a growing number of developing countries and 
especially African countries are increasingly competing for the hosting of mega sporting 
events.  These countries are often motivated by the potential benefits namely economic gain, 
nation building, socio-economic development and marketing.  She identifies South Africa as 
no stranger when it came to bidding for and hosting mega sporting events (without a doubt 
                                                 
1 A more detailed discussion and definition for soft power is supplied in Section 1.4.1. 
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also motivated by the same potential benefits).  It is then of interest to determine to what 
extent boosting the country’s international prestige and soft power forms part of the 
motivation to host mega sporting events.   
 
South African sports such as rugby and cricket – in the competitive sense – have been of 
relatively high standards for a number of years.  This had been the case even during 
apartheid.  Nevertheless, mounting international sanctions, boycotts and general isolation 
took its toll on sport as well.  Near total isolation from sport had the effect that South Africa 
could not make use of sport or sporting events to enhance its soft power.  The country’s first 
chance to attempt this came in 1992, when it was allowed to compete in sporting events such 
as the Olympic Games in Barcelona.  
 
After 1994 South Africa emerged with great moral influence, given the peaceful transition to 
democracy and fight for human rights.  It allowed South Africa to often punch above its 
weight.  In its immediate region and the African continent South Africa was seeking to 
resolve numerous conflicts.  Even internationally the country tried its hand at contributing to 
resolving conflicts in the Middle East and Ireland.  In addition, there is South Africa’s role as 
intermediary for, and representative of both the developed and developing worlds to consider 
(Barber, 2004: 147-200).   
 
Within the regional and continental context South Africa was indisputably dominant.  Other 
African states could not break from their dependence on South Africa’s economy and 
infrastructure (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998: 13, 14).  There was also no significant 
military threat in the immediate region.  Yet, in global terms, South Africa lacked the more 
traditional power resources such as military and economic capability.  Because of this 
disjuncture between South Africa’s regional and to some extent continental significance 
(limited in global terms) its foreign policy rapidly exhibited typical so-called middle power 
characteristics.  Multilateralism became the cornerstone of its foreign policy as it joined 
numerous organisations, agreements and treaties, in many instances as the leader (Barber, 
2004; Nel, Taylor & Van der Westhuizen, 2000).  South Africa also sought to establish itself 
as spokesperson for the developing world.  For one, the country became very vocal about the 
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need for substantive changes to what was perceived as an inherently unequal global trading 
system (Nicola, 2001: 3, 16, 19-23). 
 
Increasingly, the need to enhance its image as a leader of the developing world became more 
important.  As argued in later chapters, it is believed that South Africa has to rely on 
significant amounts of soft power to support its diplomatic status, its goals and initiatives, 
and leadership aspirations.  Accordingly, hosting mega-events, especially in sport, became an 
important strategy to expand its soft power.  Since the 1990s South Africa has been bidding 
for numerous such events and also hosted a considerable amount.  For example, South Africa 
played host to the 1995 Rugby World Cup, the Africa Cup of Nations in 1996, the African 
Games in 1999 and the 2003 Cricket World Cup.  There were also the failed bids for the 
2004 Olympic Games and the 2006 Federation Internationale de Football Association (Fifa) 
World Cup.  South Africa’s latest bid for a mega sporting event was for Fifa 2010.  The 24-
member Fifa executive had their final vote on May 15, 2004 and South Africa was 
announced as the host for 2010.   
 
South Africa’s bid campaign for the 2010 World Cup is the case study for this thesis.  For 
one, it is the latest bid in a long line of bids.  Therefore, if South Africa uses mega sporting 
events as a forum to boost the country’s international prestige, it has had considerable time 
and experience to perfect its technique.  Never before has the country hosted a sporting event 
of such great stature that reaches the biggest audience in the world.  Some are of the opinion 
that it is the biggest event in the world (Lee, 2004).  Since it is the most ambitious of all bids, 
this thesis examines the extent to which South Africa attempted to boost its soft power and 
prestige during the campaign.  
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND AIM OF THE STUDY 
This study investigates that South Africa consciously attempted to boost its soft power during 
the bid for the Fifa 2010 World Cup.  This is executed in the context of South Africa as an 
emerging middle power.  Accordingly the need for sufficient soft power (defined in 1.4.1.) as 
support for South Africa’s foreign policy and role as an emerging middle power is also 
considered.    
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 The case study of South Africa’s 2010 World Cup bid will then be analysed to determine if 
and how the country may have had employed the bid to boost its soft power.  The objective is 
to identify and examine clear attempts and means to enhance soft power and not to determine 
if these attempts were successful or not.    
1.3. QUESTIONS FOR INVESTIGATION 
To establish whether South Africa as a middle power is actively seeking ways to boost its 
soft power, especially by the country’s bid to host the Fifa 2010 World Cup, this study is 
guided by the following questions:  
 
• What does South Africa’s soft power consist of?  What role does soft power play in 
South Africa’s particular diplomatic status?  In other words: where, when and why is the 
support of soft power required? 
• What exactly is South Africa’s middle power role?  Is it different from general middle 
power behaviour and characteristics?  For instance, do the country’s geographical 
position, history and socio-economic and political situation determine its specific type of 
middlepowership?  How and where does South Africa’s middlepowership manifest in the 
country’s foreign policy and actions?   
• Did South Africa make use of the Fifa 2010 bid as a potential forum for marketing and 
boosting the country’s soft power and how was this attempted?  
1.4. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUALISATION    
Concepts that are central to this study are: soft power, mega sporting events, state roles and 
images and the global division of the world into North and South.  This section will 
investigate these concepts in the light of existing literature.  It will supply the theoretical 
background that will create a context for later chapters where South Africa’s emerging 
middle power (role, aspirations, soft power) are linked to the country’s participation in 
bidding for mega sporting events, in this instance specifically the Fifa 2010 bid.  
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1.4.1. Soft Power 
Literature dealing with soft power, as it is defined in this study, is scarce.  More often than 
not the focus falls on structural or hard relational power.  This is partly the result of the 
strong realist view of power in international relations theory.  To arrive at a satisfactory 
conceptualisation of soft power, the realist perception of power is also exactly from where 
this discussion commences.        
 
Waltz (1954: 205) stated that the “cardinal rule” of the game of international politics is to “do 
whatever you must in order to win it”.  Already from this it becomes apparent that in realist 
terms power is tied to the notions of self-help and self-interest.  Morgenthau held that realism 
views international politics as “a struggle for power” that is understood through “interests 
defined as power” (Keohane, 1989: 39).  Waltz (1954: 205) also referred to power as “the 
capacity to produce an intended effect”.  Thus, from Waltz and Morgenthau we gather that 
the search for power and resources of power are intrinsic to states.  In addition, power or 
rather the influence of power is needed to achieve and protect state goals and interests.     
 
Keohane (1989: 54) said that realist theorists “are using power to refer to resources that can 
be used to induce other actors to do what they would not otherwise do, in accordance with 
the desires of the power-wielder”.  Resources of power are of great importance to defining 
soft power in this study.  Power resources point to particular types of power.  For instance, 
military might and economic wealth could lead to considerable hard power.  Traditional 
realism predominately viewed power resources in such coercive terms (Keohane & Nye, 
1989: 11).  As a result, traditional realism has an inability or lack of interest in defining soft 
power.  Traditional realism’s focus on hard power resources is still relevant, but the resources 
that generate power have become much more complex.  It is more difficult to maintain 
‘power over outcomes’ because the international system has become more intricate – there 
are more actors and issues.  What is of great importance too is that weaker states are more 
self-asserting (Keohane & Nye, 1989: 11).  This is based on the idea of ‘strength in numbers’ 
and multilateral cooperation and institutions.  Thus, power resources and power types have 
changed for strong and weak states alike.  In modern times states must increasingly search 
for new power resources and ways to successfully convert it into new types of power.     
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From the sub-field of global political economy, Susan Strange (1988: 24-29) referred to the 
traditional realist definition of power as relational power, which she contrasted to structural 
power.  Relational power consists of hard power and is usually associated with more coercive 
sources and actions such as military deterrents and wealth.  Structural power is defined as the 
power that “shape and determine the structures of the global political economy.”  It is 
believed that structural power far outweighs relational power in the modern international 
political economy (Cox, 1996: 183).  Nevertheless the point is that authors identify a variety 
of power types and resources.  Alternatively the literature still deals with types and resources 
of power mostly in terms of tangible assets.  An important departure emerged with Joseph 
Nye’s distinction between hard and soft power.     
 
Joseph Nye (1990) also argued that states define power as the ability to control others.  He 
said that states mostly define power resources in tangible terms such as “population, territory, 
natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability” (Nye, 1997: 51).  In 
addition Nye (1997: 52-53, 118) identified soft power that he distinguished from other types 
of power as an “indirect way to exercise power”.  It is based on the idea that a given state 
with sufficient and effective soft power would receive the voluntary cooperation of other 
countries.  Nye (1990: 181) interchangeably referred to this as soft or co-optive power: 
 
A country may achieve the outcome it prefers in world politics because other countries want to 
follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects.  In this sense, it is just as 
important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as it is to get others to 
change in particular situations.  This aspect of power – that is, getting others to want what you 
want – might be called indirect or co-optive power behaviour.  The ability to establish the 
preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and 
institutions. 
 
Hence for co-optive power to be effective ( to get others to want what you want and thereby 
influence outcomes ) it must be viewed as legitimate while the country’s culture, ideology 
and institutions must be more than merely acceptable to other states – it must be attractive.  
 7
Although other authors don’t directly refer to soft or co-optive power, they do recognise that 
it is crucial for a state’s power to be viewed as legitimate.  
 
Strange (1997: 4) said that for structural power to become authority, the beliefs that sustain 
“the way things are done” must be perceived as legitimate by “international institutions, 
states, firms, and people”.  Mushakoji (1997: 86) stated that it is impossible to build 
legitimacy on brute force.  He also argued that ‘legitimacy’ turns brute force into power.  The 
difference lies in the approval and legitimacy of the state’s power by the international 
community.  ‘Legitimacy’ in this sense should not be confused with legitimacy as based on 
the universally accepted sovereignty of the state.  It is rather when a state’s culture, ideology, 
institutions and leadership are universally recognized as legitimate by state and non-state 
actors in the international society. 
 
Accordingly, this study will view soft power as a non-coercive means to either establish 
cooperation, or to achieve own or collective gain, by means of attractive and legitimate 
authority and power, as well as other intangible aspects such as culture, ideology and 
institutions.  Because soft or co-optive power is partly gained through features that appear 
effective and popular to others, it can also be referred to as ‘symbolic power’.  Thus, soft or 
co-optive or symbolic power2 is enhanced through gaining international prestige.  Vice versa, 
international prestige is enhanced through, for instance, symbolic power.  
 
It is apparent that the above definition of soft power may lead to questioning the importance 
or effectiveness of soft power when compared to the dominant structural and relational 
powers.  The definition of soft power should not be viewed exclusively as an alternative to 
structural and relational power.  It should also be viewed as a means to support or legitimise 
relational and structural power.  As stated, Strange said structural power must be viewed as 
legitimate.  Mushakoji said legitimacy turns force into power.  Thus, soft power can have a 
legitimising effect on more coercive types of powers.  In addition, Nye (2004a & 2004b) 
argued that in the long run a greater deployment of soft power would be more effective and 
cheaper than reliance on expensive hard power.  Also, coercive power is more likely to be 
                                                 
2 These terms will be used interchangeably.  
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damaging to how the international community view a state’s power and authority.  Nye refers 
to the growing anti-American sentiment based on the over-reliance of the U.S. government 
on hard power.  Nye’s writing on the importance of soft power is more in terms of major 
powers.  This study will point to the significance soft power holds for smaller powers, like 
South Africa.    
 
Nations have different types and amounts of power resources.  Hegemons may rely more on 
structural and relational power.  Weaker states do not have this luxury.  This is where power 
conversion becomes important.  Not all states have the ability to successfully convert 
potential resources into ‘realised power’ (Nye, 1997: 52).  Skilful conversion of power is 
especially relevant where a state’s more noticeable resources of power (military and 
economic) are outweighed by those of bigger players in the international environment.  The 
strategy for weaker states is accordingly based on attraction and not coercion.  This is where 
the importance of potential soft power resources could be converted into realised power.  
Determining quantitatively whether this has in fact occurred, is of course extremely difficult, 
given that the outcomes are not as tangible as in the case of hard power.   
 
To enhance its soft power and thereby experience greater cooperation, a state must convey 
the effectiveness and prestige of its culture, ideology, institutions and foreign policy to the 
international community.  There must be international awareness of these aspects.  In other 
words, the international community must be informed and for this, among other things, a 
country must be able to market itself to the international community.    
 
A state’s position in the international hierarchy and power resources will dictate to what 
extent it should rely on soft power.  If soft power makes up a significant portion of its entire 
power reserves, it is in that state’s best interest to actively seek out all possible ways that may 
increase its soft power.  These include opportunities with the potential to showcase or market 
the state’s culture, ideology, institutions and foreign policies in an attractive manner – 
opportunities that will legitimise the state’s power in the eyes of the world.  For this study the 
main concern in terms of opportunities for marketing a country and thereby increasing soft 
power, resides with the bidding for and hosting of mega sporting events.  
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1.4.2. Mega Sporting Events  
Mega-events in general are described by Roche (2000:1) as “large scale cultural (including 
commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and 
international significance.”  Mega-events are organised by national governmental and 
international non-governmental organisations, or variations thereof, which makes them 
“official versions of public culture”.  Cornelissen (2004a: 2), with specific reference to sport 
mega-events, said they “are quite specific in form and objective.  It refers to major, short-
term sporting festivals of worldwide status that are held on a regular basis”.  Hiller (2000) 
also explained that “mega-events are short-term high profile events like Olympics and World 
Fairs”.    
 
Mega sporting events have always been popular spectator events while the hosting of such 
events have become increasingly sought after by states.  Initially it was mostly the developed 
world that seemed interested and capable in hosting mega sporting events.  However, more 
recently, a growing number of developing states have become involved in the bidding and 
hosting of such events (Cornelissen, 2004a: 2).  Various reasons are ascribed to this 
phenomenon as stated by Black and Van der Westhuizen (2004: 1205): 
 
The pursuit and sponsorship of major games has become an increasingly popular strategy of 
governments, corporations, and other “boosters” world-wide, who habitually argue that major 
developmental, political, and socio-cultural benefits will flow from them, easily justifying the 
costs and risks involved.  These arguments may have particular resonance in “semi-peripheral” 
polities, seeking heightened visibility and prestige in the context of globalisation.  
 
Levermore (2004) discussed the relationship between sport and international relations.  The 
opinion was that sport can explain a lot about international relations.  It is not necessary to 
look further than the apartheid South African state for an example.  By excluding South 
Africa from international sport and sporting bodies, the international community’s contempt 
for the government’s policies was reflected.  Black & Van der Westhuizen (2004: 1205-
1211) furthermore argued that proponents of mega sporting events are of the opinion that 
these events could help with identity-building and signalling, marketing, development, 
promoting political liberalisation and human rights.  The latter is very much self-explaining.  
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This clearly exemplifies the potential of major sporting events to promote political 
liberalisation and human rights.    
 
The potential for development, as a spin-off of hosting a major event, has received significant 
attention.  First there is the potential of developing local sport.  In addition there are the 
economic and social development processes brought about by major sporting events.  Hall 
(1994: 160) pointed to the “centre city revitalisation...that is viewed as a major ingredient of 
economic development”.  The revitalisation is of course a consequence of redevelopment 
projects aimed at accommodating hallmark events – sport and other.  Hiller (2000) argued 
that mega-events are seen as potential capital accumulators.  In a study of the Cape Town Bid 
for the 2004 Olympics he noted that the emphasis fell on human development.  This included 
job creation and urban regeneration.  Gratton & Taylor (2000: 118, 179-181) also named job 
creation and urban regeneration as potential spin-offs of major sporting events.  They include 
the possibility for generating revenue through for instance, tourism, merchandise and ticket 
sales. 
 
The main focus of this study still resides with the identity building and signalling, and 
marketing benefits mega sporting events are believed to have.  Identity building and 
signalling do have a domestic as well as an international dimension, both of which have to do 
with “building nations, nation states and national identities” (Levermore, 2004:16).  For this 
study the focus is however directed to the international dimension.  Accordingly, signalling 
means the “desire to signal key developments or changes, both at home and abroad (Black & 
Van der Westhuizen, 2004: 1205).  It goes hand in hand with the potential of mega-events to 
market the host country and/or city to the international community.  Hall (1994: 160, 163) 
said that governments view hallmark events almost always as beneficial “because of their 
ability to promote appropriate images of places...and state interests may be enhanced through 
the promotion of politically dominant values”. 
 
For these reasons, the interest of this thesis lies with the connection between mega sports 
events and the potential it holds for enhancing soft power.  It has been stated that soft power 
is only effective if it is attractive and legitimate in the eyes of the world.  It is the reason why 
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this study is especially interested in the political signalling of mega sporting events as a 
means to promote any particular (or chosen) aspect of the host nation.  Roche (2000:6) points 
to the potential of mega-events in presenting the host nation to the world:  
 
They (mega-events) represented and continue to represent key occasions in which nations could 
construct and present images of themselves for recognition in relation to other nations and in the 
eyes of the world.  They represent and continue to represent key occasions in which national 
tradition and community, including a national past, present and future (national progress, 
potential and destiny), could be invented and imagined not just by and for leaders and citizens of 
the host nation, but also for and by publics of other nations.  
 
Gratton & Taylor (2000: 181) say that mega sporting events present “unique marketing 
opportunities”, as the growing competition under broadcasters led to blanket coverage and 
expanded media coverage at peak times.  Considering the fact that mega sporting events are 
watched by huge international audiences, it is obvious that the marketing benefits are 
seriously increased.  But ‘unique marketing opportunities’ should not only be viewed in 
commercial or tourism terms.  Hiller (2000) argued that mega-events could be analysed and 
used as tools for promoting government’s policy.  He also says that governments link mega-
events to “its own objectives of aggrandizement.”  So, governments are biased in favour of 
supporting these events that present the opportunity to support and market government policy 
to the domestic population and international community.   
 
Beck (2004: 77) highlighted that hosting major events like the Olympics or Fifa World Cup, 
is intimately linked to promoting the international prestige of the host nation.  Thus, taking 
into consideration what was stated in the preceding section, if international prestige is 
enhanced it will necessarily boost soft power.  This is even more significant considering that 
the host nation usually has a more powerful role in the sporting event than the guest nations 
(Roche, 2000:9-10).  After all, the event is taking place within the sovereign territory of the 
host nation.  Since mega-events are huge media events, the host nation may use this superior 
and advantageous influence to promote any particular aspect it chooses.  These media 
moments enable the host nation to project multiple images and messages.  From projecting 
the country’s moral and ideological views to showcasing new technologies, investment 
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opportunities, and its various tourist destinations (Gratton & Taylor, 2000: 181; Roche, 2000: 
10).  Conversely, the opportunity could also be used to downplay any existing negative 
aspects and images.  Beck (2004: 78) refers to this as “sport’s propaganda potential in terms 
of reflecting and enhancing, as well as diminishing.” 
 
There are thus various motivations for states to host mega-events.  It is also clear that some 
motivations are linked to the potential of mega-events to promote and market a country in 
one way or another.  Furthermore, this ‘promotion’ or ‘marketing’ has to do with creating 
and projecting favourable images of the host nation in the eyes of the world.  These projected 
images, it is argued, will boost the nation’s soft power.  The projected   images could 
additionally support specific roles the host nation may fulfil or would want to fulfil.  It is 
therefore necessary for this study to understand what is meant by ‘roles’ and ‘images’. 
1.4.3. State Images and Roles 
An exhaustive discussion on state images and roles is not required for this study.  It is 
necessary to have an understanding of what is meant by state roles or the images the host 
nation wants to project.  State roles and images are both connected to foreign policy 
objectives and behaviour.  Holsti (1967: 158), in reference to policy-making and policy-
makers, argued that humans act according to the image of their environments.  In this context 
he defines image as:  
 
an individuals perceptions of an object, fact, or condition, his evaluation of that object, fact, or 
condition in terms of its goodness or badness, friendliness or hostility, or value, and the 
meaning ascribed to, or deduced from, that object, fact, or condition.  
 
Consequently the view policy-makers, politicians and populations of foreign nations have of 
a particular state is based on their perceptions and evaluation of that state’s image, as well as 
the condition, value and meaning they ascribe to that image.  For that reason, it can be 
derived that if a state wanted to increase its soft power, it would have to raise its international 
prestige by projecting a favourable image of itself to other states.   
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Images are also connected to roles.  Holsti (1967: 172-173) viewed the roles states assume as 
“orientations towards the outside world”.  These could include, among others, roles of 
mediators, block leaders, carriers of ideology and neutrals.  He also argued that the roles 
states assume create certain obligations and commitments that “policy-makers will usually 
have to fulfil”.  This could create certain “expectations” from other states of what is to be 
expected of a particular state in particular situations.  As a result, expectations from the 
international community can partly “sustain a state’s international role” (Holsti, 1967: 172).  
 
It was mentioned that state images and roles are connected to foreign policy-making and 
behaviour.  Therefore, a state’s image, or the image it attempts to create, could also be linked 
to the roles it fulfils.  Any particular role that a state fulfils in the international community 
could be indicative of the particular image it would like to portray to the international 
community.  Then of course, the image it chose to project could also be indicative of the role 
it fulfils, or would like to fulfil.  For instance, a state may often assume a neutral position 
between conflicting parties and act as mediator, peacekeeper, and promoter of peace and 
security.  The particular state may also promote an image of itself being a moral authority in 
the international community.  Such an image will of course lend credibility to that state’s role 
as conflict negotiator, mediator and promoter of peace and security.  As is discussed in the 
following chapters, some of the roles South Africa fulfils are that of regional leader, 
mediator, peacekeeper and intermediary.  
 
‘Image’ in this study, does not only refer to the existing image a state may have in the 
international community.  It essentially points to the image a state would like to have.  It is 
the way it wants to be perceived by other states and it is the way it is actively trying to 
project or market itself.  If this is the case, it is necessary to know who the target market is.  
For reasons that will become clear later South Africa’s interests in creating a favourable 
image of itself and boosting its soft power are broadly discussed in terms of positioning itself 
as a “bridge builder” between North and South.   
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1.4.4. Global North and Global South  
It is noted that the idea of dividing the modern interstate systems into only two classifications 
is limiting, problematic, and has a serious disregard for various other factors.  Buzan & 
Wæver (2003: 20-26)3 pointed out the misconceptions when assuming that “the world has 
evolved into a fairly uniform system of Westphalian-type states differentiated from each 
other principally by their degree of power, their geographical location, and their cultural 
background.”  But incorporating all factors will lead to unnecessary complication.  
Therefore, a division into two worlds serves to simplify the study.  
 
A further explanation is that ‘North’ and ‘South’ do not necessarily refer to the geographical 
locations of the relevant states.  It is rather a reflection of the level of economic development 
and wealth of a nation (Nicola, 2000:11).  Alden (1999: 217) said that it has more of a 
political, economic and ideological meaning.  Consequently, the concept indicates the 
developmental differences between states.  Northern states are also associated with the 
developed world of which the G-84 and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries are most relevant.  Southern states refer to the developing 
world and their exclusive organisations such as the Non Aligned Movement (NAM).  In 
other words these are states with relatively low economic development compared to Northern 
states that are largely marginalised in the global economy.  In terms of the world systems 
theory the South forms the periphery, or at best, the semi-periphery.       
 
I would like to point out that the division between North and South also extends to middle 
powers that are located either in the North or the South.  Consequently, Northern middle 
powers are referred to as ‘traditional middle powers’, while Southern middle powers are 
known as ‘emerging middle powers’.  There are also significant differences in the 
behavioural characteristics of these two types of middle powers.  This is discussed in greater 
detail in 2.2.2. 
                                                 
3 Buzan and Wæver’s discussion is in the context of different state legacies of regional security complexes.  
It is however considered relevant when trying to illustrate the difficulty in dividing and classifying states 
into groups.  It should therefore support the practice of dividing states into two groups/worlds when dealing 
with ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. 
4 The G-8 includes the U.S.A., Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, and Russia. 
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1.5. METHODOLOGY  
This study is a qualitative assessment which seeks to show how South Africa was actively 
trying to boost its soft power by making use of the bid to host the Fifa 2010 World Cup as a 
marketing platform to enhance the country’s soft power.  The approach will be descriptive, 
explanatory and evaluatory since the study will apply established theoretical concepts to the 
arguments.  It will also be exploratory because, up to the conclusion of the study, the author 
did not come across any in-depth scholarly work dealing specifically with South Africa’s 
2010 World Cup bid.   
 
Data collection pertaining to the case study was predominantly obtained through the media.  
This includes the print media, such as newspapers, magazines and their Internet equivalents 
covering the period January 2003 to June 2004.  The official websites for the South African 
Bid Committee, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Government Communication and 
Information System (GCIS), International Marketing Council for South Africa (IMC), and 
Fifa were also incorporated.  
 
The case study presents the opportunity to explore the claims that mega sporting events 
present opportunities for marketing a country and thereby enhancing its international 
prestige.  This is also directly related to the main question of whether South Africa attempted 
to enhance its soft power during its 2010 bid.  Investigating this question in relation to South 
Africa necessitates establishing what South Africa’s global position, power resources, its 
dealings with Africa, the South and North and its objectives were.  It will be discussed in the 
context of South Africa’s emerging middle power status for which existing academic 
research and journal literature have been integrated.    
 
To establish if and how South Africa attempted to boost its soft power it is argued that the 
country projected specific images of itself to the international community.  The specific 
intent of each image was to portray the relevant issues in a favourable light to intended 
‘audiences’.  Therefore this study seeks to elucidate the kinds of images and messages 
officials have sought to project as manifestations of attempts to expand South Africa’s soft 
 16
power.  The official website for the 2010 Bid is also looked at to establish how the relevant 
images might have been supported.     
1.6. LIMITS TO THE RESEARCH 
Although this study incorporates written material on mega-events in general, the analysis is 
limited to mega-sporting events – specifically South Africa’s bid for the Fifa 2010 World 
Cup and to a lesser degree, the Fifa 2006 bid.  Existing literature provides different 
motivations for why governments are in favour of bidding and hosting mega-events.  Some 
of these have been named as identity building and signalling, nation building, developmental 
spin-offs and economic and marketing benefits or opportunities.  However, for the most part, 
the focus falls on the potential marketing and signalling opportunities inherent in the Fifa 
2010 bid campaign.  This attempts to promote the country’s soft power.  Thus, the link 
between, for instance, economic benefits of mega-events and promoting soft power is not 
investigated.  Therefore, the focus is very specific and pertains essentially to the way in 
which South Africa sought to project certain favourable images and roles of itself during the 
2010 bid, to make both the country in general and the bid specifically, more appealing and 
attractive to the international community.  
 
The possibility also exists that bidding and hosting mega-events can actually have the 
opposite effect than intended.  For instance, it can reflect negatively on the host or bidding 
nation.  Dimeo & Kay (2004) stated that a mega-event, or the publicity it generates, may spin 
out of the host nation’s control.  Also, anti-state and other social groupings may capitalise a 
mega-event as their own forum for projecting their message.  In terms of the South African 
bid for 2010, these are mostly not considered.    
1.7. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The chapters are structured around the research questions provided in 1.3.  Chapter II 
investigates the middle power concept in relation to South Africa.  A distinction is drawn 
between two groups of middle powers – traditional and emerging.  Based on the given 
criteria a case is then made that South Africa is in fact an emerging middle power.  Keeping 
emerging middle power behaviour and characteristics in mind, South Africa’s position, 
actions, policies and power are discussed in terms of Africa and the South, as well as the 
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North.  Chapter II will create a context for South Africa’s regional, continental and global 
position and it will be a point of reference for discussing the next chapter.  The argument 
holds that South Africa projected certain favourable images of itself during the 2010 bid.  
These images are directly related to South Africa’s soft power, foreign policy objectives and 
middle power position.  
 
In Chapter III the attention turns to South Africa’s bid for the 2010 World Cup.  Thought, 
before the case study is analysed, soft power and why it is important in relation to Africa, the 
South, and the North is investigated.  It is also argued that South Africa has a serious need to 
continuously boost its soft power.  Here the focus will only fall on bidding and hosting mega-
events as a means to enhance soft power.  Accordingly, South Africa’s history in hosting 
mega-events is discussed only briefly.  The main focus is on the South African bid to host the 
2010 World Cup.  Here the focus falls on the country’s energetic attempt to enhance its soft 
power by projecting certain chosen images of itself to the rest of the world.  
 
To conclude, Chapter IV provides a summary of the main arguments as well as concluding 
remarks.  Certain aspects worthy of future research – especially in terms of the actual Fifa 
event in 2010 – are briefly discussed.   
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CHAPTER II 
SOUTH AFRICA  AS AN EMERGING MIDDLE POWER 
 
“Since South Africa’s main foreign policy concern is to be part of shaping the global agenda, 
we would want to become a permanent member of the Security Council”  
 Jackie Selebi, former Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs (Barber, 2004: 155)  
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
By 1988 apartheid South Africa was the “most isolated country on the planet” (Vale, 1997: 
203).  Economic boycotts and sanctions were severe and the diplomatic front looked equally 
dismal.  Pretoria had only a handful of overt bilateral relations and the ability to operate in 
multilateral frameworks was seriously restricted.  In the limited instances where South Africa 
did have diplomatic manoeuvrability, government officials were preoccupied with defending 
highly contentious and offensive domestic and foreign policies.  Government officials were 
also defending a state that faced a growing legitimacy crisis in terms of international public 
opinion.  Then, along with the country’s first democratic elections and regime change in 
1994, South Africa experienced a phenomenal re-entry to the international arena. 
 
Between 1989 and 1995 the country’s foreign diplomatic missions increased from 30 to 124.  
By 1999 South Africa was party to 45 international organisations and multilateral treaties 
(Barber, 2004: 149-151; Nel, Taylor & Van der Westhuizen, 2000).  Where governments 
once went out of their way to shun South Africa from international relations they were now 
eager to publicly engage5 with the ‘miracle’ state.  What was furthermore striking was the 
relative swiftness of these changes.  South Africa literally went from being the international 
outcast to the international hero in only a few years.   
 
                                                 
5 It is noted that sanctions and boycotts did not disappear overnight but did take time and negotiation to 
remove.  The fact however remains that public international opinion accepted and approved of the New 
South Africa (Vale, 1999).  
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The African National Congress’ anti-apartheid struggle was largely based on human rights 
issues.  These issues then also became a central focus of the government’s post- apartheid 
foreign policy and multilateral engagements, although it has been argued in recent years that 
human rights issues have moved down the government’s list of priorities (Black, 2001: 76).  
However, in contrast to the prior government who had been perceived as an oppressor and 
human rights abuser by the international community, the new South Africa developed an 
image as the international protector of human rights.  To a large extent this role was self-
appointed, but global expectation also pressured South Africa into this role.  This expectation 
was rooted in the idea that because South Africa had struggled against oppression and human 
rights abuses for decades, the role of universal protector of human rights will be a ‘natural’ 
position to take on.  Whatever the case, South Africa revealed reformist and activist 
tendencies in the name of global equality and cooperation.   
 
The important result has been that South Africa’s behaviour and role have evolved in such a 
way that the country now assumes a new position in the international arena.  This new role 
and behaviour is that of a middle power.  This point of view is widely conceded by 
international relations scholars as more literature on the subject becomes readily available 
(Black, 2001; Cooper, 1997; Nel, Taylor & Van der Westhuizen, 2000; Vale, 1997).   
 
This chapter argues that South Africa is in fact an emerging middle power.  This particular 
brand of middlepowership manifests in the country’s policies and actions and is discussed 
accordingly.  South Africa’s role and position in Africa, the South and the North is discussed 
against the backdrop of it being an emerging middle power.  It is furthermore argued that the 
country exhibits reformist agendas in terms of African political and economic environments, 
as well as the global economic environment.  There is however certain limitations and 
problems associated with reformist agendas.  This chapter will add to the background of why 
soft power is crucial for South Africa’s future. 
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2.2. THE MIDDLE POWER CONCEPT 
2.2.1 Conceptualising Middle Powers   
Middle powers share certain characteristics and behaviours – quantifiable and theoretical.  
These may be used to suggest whether a state displays a middle power orientation.  A basic 
description of a middle power is a country that stands between the greater and smaller states 
in the international hierarchical structure.  This is however a very vague description.  It is the 
same as describing a semi-periphery as standing between core and periphery countries.  For a 
more precise discussion on middle powers it is necessary to turn to international relations 
theory that provides two broad traditions for explaining middle powers.   
 
Initially Keohane dealt with the middle power concept during the Cold War era.  He stated 
that “a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but 
may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international 
institution” (Keohane, 1969: 296).  However, Keohane (1969) and other authors of that era 
such as Rothstein and Vital, predominantly viewed the roles and behaviour of middle powers 
in term of the bipolar international structure of the Cold War.  Thereby the concept of middle 
powers was mostly viewed in terms of global security, as well as the security and survival of 
the middle power itself.  Therefore the focus often fell on middle power “actions taken in 
balance-of-power situations”.  There was also emphasis on middle power fondness for 
international organisations caused by the “potential security of membership”.  In other words, 
‘collective security’ was given great attention, such as the capacity of international 
organisations, like the UN, to “restrain great powers” (Keohane, 1969: 294, 298).  
 
These were of course very relevant during the Cold War.  Nevertheless, structural changes 
such as the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bi-polar power structure, inevitably 
caused changes to the nature, behaviour and characteristics of middle powers.  Accordingly 
the second tradition and its global political economy approach of Robert Cox, and also Black 
(1997) and Cooper (1997), are useful in describing middle powers.  
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This tradition considers the roles and functions of middle powers beyond the restricting and 
obsolete Cold War context.  This tradition will form the main reference for middle powers in 
this study.  Cox (1996:244) stated that middle powers are likely to be “in the middle rank of 
material capabilities”.  Barber (2004:152) too is of the opinion that there are certain 
quantifiable characteristics associated with middle powers.  He said that middle powers hold 
positions in the global hierarchy that can usually be determined through measurable assets 
such as area, population, economy and military capability.  He added that a state’s 
geographical situation will also influence the power that this state wields in its region.  It 
should however be noted that Cox (1996: 524-525) considered the size of a country to play a 
lesser role when it comes to being a middle power.  For Cox the preferred means for 
identifying a middle power was through its particular role/s in the international system and its 
multilateral nature.  Keohane (1969: 294) too recognised that there are quantifiable assets 
associated with middle powers but that these are subjective and not precise analytical tools.   
 
Keohane (1969: 298, 303) argued that middle powers acted to protect global security during 
the Cold War.  This would however concede an attempt to restrain great powers.  The great 
powers, however, supply legitimacy to international organisations.  Furthermore, 
international organisations, like the UN, provide the main forums from where middle powers 
can act.  Therefore we can assume that middle powers will also exhibit an amount of restraint 
in their criticism of the great power.     
  
This view has also been held by Cox but with slightly different reasoning.  He made the point 
that middle powers play a supporting role in the hegemonic order of the day (Cox, 1996: 
243).  The roles middle powers fulfil contribute to some degree of order and stability in the 
hegemonic order.  The reasoning for this is that regularity and predictability of the 
international system is directly linked to the interests of middle powers.  On the other hand, 
the interests of the dominant power are usually supported by the rules, practices and 
ideologies of the hegemonic order.  Therefore middle powers have an interest in supporting 
the hegemonic order of the day.   
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Part of the reason for this is that, in contrast to hegemons, middle powers lack decisive 
structural power throughout the political spectrum (Black, 1997; Cooper, 1997).  Also, unlike 
hegemons middle powers do not hold the economic and military backing that are essential for 
determining (or at least influencing) the desired outcomes in various instances.  Despite this, 
middle powers still have the need for a certain degree of power in various forms to support 
their policies and sustain their middle power status.  Therefore, what middle powers do is to 
find what Cooper (1997: 6) identifies as their ‘niche diplomacy’.  Black (1997: 107) called it 
the “development of sophisticated diplomatic (or persuasive) skills”.  When referring to the 
rise to prominence of middle powers, Keohane also mentions the “important diplomatic 
innovations” middle powers have had.  There are numerous different diplomatic skills, 
innovations and resources that these authors associate with middle powers.  All of them 
include a preference for multilateral cooperation and frameworks.  Different middle powers 
will also make use of different diplomatic skills and resources in different situations.  Hence 
the term ‘niche diplomacy’.   
 
Cox (1997: xxvii and 1996:244) viewed the ‘middle’ in middle power as reference to 
“working in the middle towards cooperative internationalism” and not as much as a reflection 
of military and economic capability.  Barber (2004: 152) then also said that middle powers 
tend to follow multilateral solutions to international problems.  They prefer negotiation and 
cooperation in international disputes, and welcome and respect notions of “good international 
citizenship”.  Middlepowership is best summed up in the words of Cox (1996: 244):   
 
The ability to take a certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a sufficient 
degree of autonomy in relation to major powers, a commitment to orderliness and security in 
inter-state relations and to facilitating of orderly change in the world system are the critical 
elements for fulfilment of the middle power role.  
 
From the above discussion it is clear that because middle powers assume these roles and 
positions they are often regarded as unselfish, wise, trustworthy and virtuous.  They are 
perceived as the ones that will always take the moral high ground.  However, Barber (2004: 
244) pointed out that this normative basis for classification attracts serious criticism and 
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scepticism.  It is accurate to say that middle powers contribute to greater international order, 
stability, predictability and controllability.  This is also exactly where their long-term self-
interest resides (Jordaan, 2003: 166-167).  David Black (1997: 103) has argued:   
 
Middle powers are not simply middle powers because of their participation in mediation, bridge 
building activity or cooperation in certain technical areas, but because it suits their long term 
interests vis-à-vis world order, the world economy, and the pursuit of dominant societal values 
and interests, all supported by significant material/technological/bureaucratic capabilities, to do 
so. 
 
Although the above discussion may have formed a better understanding of middle powers, it 
still incorporates all middle powers under one banner.  It is of course possible to derive 
certain assumptions on the general behaviour and characteristics of middle powers – as was 
done in the above discussion.  However, there are also important differences between middle 
powers.  With differences I do not imply, for instance, the differences in power, resources 
and international organisation membership that middle power a holds in relation to middle 
power B – although these do exist.  It is rather a reference to different groups of middle 
powers and the different characteristics and behaviour they display in relation to each other.   
 
Most of the literature and authors associate middle power behaviour and roles with the global 
North.  This is not surprising since in the past most middle powers were Northern states such 
as Canada and The Netherlands.  Furthermore, besides multilateral behaviour, middle powers 
were also believed to have power and resources that are more reminiscent of hegemons than 
states that are positioned lower down the international hierarchy.  Thus, it was mostly 
Northern states that could measure up to such expectations.  However, after the Cold War 
academics started to recognise that middle powers may also be located in the South, and a 
distinction was drawn between what is considered a traditional middle power (located in the 
North) and what is called an emerging middle power (located in the South).   
 
This part of the study deals with South Africa’s influence as a middle power and also how it 
attempts to expand its power in that regard.  It is necessary to point out that South Africa is 
first and foremost part of the global South.  Therefore it is also likely that the country is an 
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emerging middle power.  The relevance of this will have to be established because if South 
Africa is in fact an emerging middle power, it will not suffice to discuss the country 
according to ‘general’ or ‘traditional’ middle power characteristics and behaviour.   
 
The next section will consider the differences between traditional and emerging middle 
powers.  It will serve to create a context for South Africa’s particular middlepowership.  By 
being able to identify South Africa’s particular brand of middlepowership, it will be possible 
to reveal how South Africa tries to expand its diplomatic influence.  
2.2.2 Differences: Traditional vs. Emerging Middle Powers 
It is believed that previous studies have considered middle powers to be located exclusively 
in the North.  Cooper (1997: 14) notes that: 
 
such an exclusionary process leaves out the broader range of states, including not only 
Australia6 but India, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Malaysia, Argentina, Turkey and South Africa 
which have been included in alternative lists of middle powers as divined by their in-between 
position in the international community.  
 
Because of their more recent appearance they are termed emerging middle powers.  
Conversely traditional middle powers point to countries situated in the global North (Nel, 
Taylor & Van Der Westhuizen, 2000).  Canada, The Netherlands and the Scandinavian 
countries serve as examples of traditional middle powers.  The purpose of this section is to 
identify the main constitutive and behavioural differences between traditional and emerging 
middle powers.  The aim is to highlight and briefly describe the differences.  These 
differences will feature in a more thorough discussion when applied to the case of South 
Africa as an emerging middle power in the next section.   
 
From the onset it is obvious that the ‘global division’ that exists between traditional and 
emerging middle powers did and will continue to cause differences.  For instance, Northern 
states are economically wealthier, politically more powerful and better represented than 
                                                 
6 In this instance Australia is included with Southern middle powers.  However, the country is widely 
considered to be a traditional middle power, as pointed out by Henrikson (1997).   
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Southern states.  The North and South have also had different influences in their political 
development and history.  For instance, some Northern states are former colonisers while 
certain Southern states have been colonised.   
 
On the other hand, Southern or emerging middle powers often display political and economic 
power and development that is alien to their immediate region and other states in the South.  
Barber (2004: 152) points out that a (emerging) middle power can sometimes also be 
classified according to the power it wields in its geographical region.  They are usually much 
stronger in political and economic terms, as well as in the amount of influence it has in 
regional organisations.  In these instances emerging middle powers display characteristics 
comparable to Northern states. 
 
The above mentioned influences are only scratching the surface when considering possible 
reasons for the current state of the international structure and the various roles of different 
middle powers therein.  Of importance is that the above mentioned influences will 
necessarily cause differences in the behaviour and roles of the two types.  An outline of the 
main constitutive and behavioural differences between traditional and emerging middle 
powers is shown in Table 1, p 26.  
 
Traditional middle powers are usually core states with stable democracies.  They emerged as 
middle powers during the interwar, Second World War and Cold War years.  For instance, 
Henrikson (1997: 51) discusses Canada’s and Australia’s development and involvement as 
middle powers during and after the Second World War.  On the other hand, emerging middle 
powers are usually semi-peripheries whose middle power identity appeared after the Cold 
War.  They are also young democracies with some undemocratic features (Jordaan, 2003: 
171-173).  Undemocratic features for instance, manifest as significant human rights abuses 
and one-party dominant political systems, as is the case with Malaysia.  Also, unlike their 
Northern counterparts, emerging middle powers like Brazil have a highly unequal 
distribution of domestic wealth.  
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Table 1.  Differences between Traditional and Emerging Middle Powers.  
 Traditional Middle Powers Emerging Middle Powers 
Constitutive Differences 
Democratic Tradition Stable social democracies Relatively unstable, recently 
democratised with some very 
undemocratic aspects 
Time of Emergence as  
Middle Power 
During the Cold War After the Cold War 
Position in World Economy Core Semi-periphery 
Domestic Distribution 
 of Wealth 
Very equal Highly unequal 
Regional Influences Low High 
Origin of Perceived 
 Neutrality 
Regional ambivalence 
 and relative unimportance 
Regional self-association and 
significance 
Behavioural Differences 
Regional Orientation Fairly low Moderately high 
Attitude to Regional  
Integration and Cooperation 
Ambivalent Eager (often assuming  
leadership role) 
Nature of Actions to Effect  
Global Change 
Appeasing and legitimising Reformist and legitimising 
Purpose of International  
Identity Construction 
Distance from powerful 
 in the region 
Distance from weak in the region
Source: Jordaan (2003: 168) 
 
Another important difference is that contrary to traditional middle powers, emerging middle 
powers are stronger than the states in their immediate region.  Compare for instance the 
neighbours of The Netherlands (representing a traditional middle power in Western Europe) 
with those of Brazil (as an emerging middle power in South America).  Emerging middle 
powers are also more involved in regional cooperation and often take the lead in regional 
structures and organisations.  Traditional middle powers are rather ambivalent towards the 
same issues in their immediate regions.  This often happens as a result of the power 
differential between them and their powerful neighbours.   
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As far as middle powers aim at affecting global change, both traditional and emerging middle 
powers are described as legitimising since they look at ways in which global threats could be 
contained (Jordaan, 2003:173-178).  This reinforces what was mentioned earlier, namely, 
that middle powers play a supporting role in the hegemonic order of the day (Cox, 1996: 
243).  However, traditional middle powers tend to be appeasing, while emerging middle 
powers display reformist tendencies.  The motivation for this resides in the fact that emerging 
middle powers stand to benefit from reforms in the global economy.  These emerging middle 
powers are however very reserved with the criticism they direct against the major powers of 
the day, since they also stand to lose a lot, as will become clearer later.  Having delineated 
the criteria associated with emerging middle powers, these can now be applied to South 
Africa.      
2.3. SOUTH AFRICA AS AN EMERGING MIDDLE POWER  
Criteria from the previous section seem to support the argument for South Africa’s emerging 
middlepowership.  South Africa only became a democracy in 1994 and is still battling with 
transformational difficulties.  There are for instance, tensions between economic reforms 
such as privatisation on the one hand, and alleviating poverty and job creation on the other.  
The country’s growing internationalism and multilateralism only took root after the end of 
the Cold War and apartheid.  Furthermore, the country is a semi-periphery in the world 
economy and is known for its highly unequal domestic distribution of wealth.  South Africa’s 
Human Development Index ranking is 119 and it has a Gini Index of 59.3 (UNDP, 2003).  
Inequality over the distribution of income and consumption in South Africa is thus extremely 
high.  
 
But it is in the behavioural characteristics where the real importance of South Africa’s 
emerging middlepowership lies.  These include the country’s regional influence and 
orientation, attitude to regional integration and cooperation, nature of actions to effect global 
change and the purpose of international identity construction.  It is also evident in the 
behavioural characteristics where South Africa’s (and other emerging middle powers’) ‘in-
between’ position in the international hierarchy comes into play.   
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The above-mentioned will be discussed under two broad headings.  The first is South 
Africa’s Regional, African and Southern context.  The second is South Africa’s Global 
Context and Relationship with the North.  The reason why the focus mainly falls on these 
two areas is credited to South Africa’s self-appointed (and often perceived as ‘natural’) role 
as a go-between and bridge builder.  As will become clear, these roles are central to South 
Africa’s foreign policy and long term interests.  It also fits perfectly in the domain of a 
middle power.  
 
Some local and international actors also consider South Africa as a ‘natural’ link or bridge 
between the North and South.  This notion is based on some of the country’s characteristics.  
For instance, South Africa’s economic structure has First and Third World sections; it has 
interests in both worlds; and its geographical position spans from the Atlantic to the Indian 
Ocean (Bischoff, 2003; Saul, 2004: 78; Barber, 2004: 158).  The argument goes that these 
unique features enable South Africa to understand the position, needs and demands of both 
worlds and so convey it to both as well.  For instance, South Africa carries the South’s plight 
and need for debt relief to their Northern creditors.  South Africa may convey the North’s 
expectations for peace, security and democracy in the South, to the South.   
 
The focus on the two areas is not only because of South Africa’s role as go-between and 
bridge builder.  South Africa has its own long-term interests at heart.  And, as will be 
discussed, these interests also reside in South Africa’s capacity to interrelate between North 
and South.   
2.3.1 South Africa’s Regional, African and Southern Context 
Saul (2004: 78) points out that South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) government 
came to power “with the strongest of Third World credentials”.  They have also built on their 
struggle credentials to “present themselves, both domestically and internationally, as key 
representatives, interpreters and defenders of the countries of the Southern poor”.  Such a 
high profile moral position fits neatly in the emerging middle power grouping.  But being the 
‘champion of the South’ is crucial for South Africa’s future as well since it can provide the 
country with invaluable support from Southern countries.   
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Other African states and specifically those in South Africa’s immediate region are of great 
importance.  To a large degree South Africa’s future goals and successes are and will be 
directly influenced by the political and economic condition of its region and the continent.  A 
leading reason for this is that Africa now represents one of South Africa’s single largest 
export markets (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998: 6, 12).  As an African and regional 
hegemon it is in South Africa’s own, as well as in  the collective African interest to present 
the case on behalf of Africa to the North.   
 
A few quantifiable assets place South Africa comfortably in the emerging middle power 
category.  The country wields considerable power (both relational and structural) vis-à-vis 
other African states.  It is also obvious why South Africa enjoys descriptions such as the 
‘African giant’ and ‘African power’.  In terms of infrastructure, transportation, 
telecommunication, electricity generation, and trade the country is unequalled by any other in 
Africa (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998: 13-20).  In fact, most Southern African states 
are dependent on South Africa’s transport infrastructure and a regular supply of electricity 
for their industries and trade.   
 
South Africa has a population of 43.6 million (World Bank, 2003).  The combined 
population of the 11 countries which make up the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) is 190 million (Ramsamy, 2003).  Thus, South Africa’s population 
represents nearly a fifth of the regions total population.  The South African economy is 3.4 
times larger than the combined economies of the other SADC countries (Ahwireng-Obeng & 
McGowan, 1998: 20).  Furthermore, South Africa produces 44% of the total GDP (1995) for 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  More recently South Africa accounted for 75% of SADC’s US$ 
127 billion market (Martin, 2002:163).  By 1997 the number of South African military 
personnel was only second to Angola (110 000 to 90 000), with the next largest being the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with 40 000 personnel (Barber, 2004: 183).   
 
But South Africa’s emerging middlepowership is not supported by quantifiable assets alone.  
As Cox noted, middle power identification is most evident or relevant in the particular role(s) 
and multilateral nature of the state in question.  Emerging middle power behaviour and 
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characteristics then also manifest most visibly in South Africa’s actions, policies and 
involvement in Africa.  
 
As is the case with emerging middle powers, South Africa is highly involved in its regional 
and continental environment.  Regional integration and cooperation features high on the 
South African agenda and the country often assumes leadership positions in regional and 
African organisations and initiatives.  The rationale for this kind of behaviour and high level 
of involvement is partly because of the fact that South Africa is in a completely different 
class when compared to its immediate neighbours and other African peers.  It is much more 
resourceful and outweighs the others economically and politically and therefore also has a 
large amount of control over the relevant initiatives and regional organisations.  An example 
here would be South Africa’s strong position in SADC, Southern African Customs Union, 
and the African Union.  This stands in contrast to traditional middle powers that usually have 
less or equal power in relation to others in their region.  Since traditional middle powers have 
less power in their regions they will also have less influence and control over regional 
projects.  As a result they will rather steer clear of regional projects (Jordaan, 2003: 177).  
   
South Africa’s eager involvement in all aspects concerning multilateralism is probably the 
most obvious example of its emerging middle power aspirations.  South Africa’s multilateral 
foreign policy approach towards Africa and its power and position on the continent are of 
course closely related.  During the late 1990s South Africa’s position and leadership in the 
rebuilding of Africa became very prominent under President Thabo Mbeki and his ideas for 
the ‘African Renaissance’ (Nicola, 2001:19, 20).  Special emphasis was placed on good 
political and economic governance while older and obsolete African organisations and 
initiatives had to make way for new ones.  What is of importance is that it became noticeable 
that South Africa regarded multilateralism as central to all aspects concerning Africa’s 
development.  In reference to South Africa’s foreign policy Bischoff (2003: 184) states:  
  
It has contributed to issues such as international multilateral regimes on a global trading 
system, debt relief for poor countries, nuclear non-proliferation and the constitution of an 
International Criminal Court.  The idea of a reformed SADC, the call for an ‘African 
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Renaissance’ or the plan for a New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) within the 
context of an African Union, which replaced the Organisation of African Unity, have been the 
most recent part of this pluralist–multilateralist impulse.  
 
The African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), Pan African 
Parliament (PAP), African Peace and Security Council (APSC) and SADC are the more 
important examples of South Africa’s multilateral involvement in (and as a driver behind) 
regional cooperation, integration and leadership aspirations that are aimed at transforming the 
African environment.  These are then also criteria by which South Africa can be classified as 
an emerging middle power.  
 
As far as South Africa’s immediate region is concerned, its leadership in SADC featured 
quite prominently after 1994.  Some hold the view that South Africa is the only country on 
the continent with enough leverage to negotiate fairly favourable trade agreements for SADC 
and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)7.  In 1996 President Mandela then also 
became the organisation’s chairperson (Barber, 2004: 188).  Ironically, SADC was founded 
in 1980 with the intended purpose to make the Southern African region less dependent on 
South Africa.  It was then known as the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC).  After Mandela became chairperson of SADC, South Africa’s active 
involvement was aimed at making the organisation more effective and efficient while 
creating better consensus and cooperation.  
However, the AU and its relevant organs and initiatives started to overshadow the other 
African organisations – at least from the South African perspective.  South Africa is deeply 
committed to the AU, since the organisation is a primary platform from which South Africa’s 
plans and ideals for Africa are executed.  Its importance is evident from the fact that a large 
part of the AU’s budget is financed by South Africa.  On top of that South Africa pays a 
premium subscription fee to the AU and it is argued that these actions are intended to ensure 
that the AU keeps afloat (Mail & Guardian, 3/10/2003).  The AU is furthermore important to 
                                                 
7 It is noted that this is a very controversial issue with contesting viewpoints.  I am therefore not attempting 
to argue that it is indeed what is happening.  Rather it just serves as support that South Africa’s position in 
Africa is head and shoulders above the rest.  
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South Africa because the Pan African Parliament, Nepad or the African Renaissance in 
general, all falls within the contexts of the AU.  The AU was also intended to replace the 
terribly ineffective OAU.  In addition South Africa played host to the opening and the first 
AU summit that was held in Durban, 2002.   
As far as Nepad is concerned Thabo Mbeki is considered to be the pilot of this initiative.  
Nepad is widely considered as the main developmental program for Africa.  Ultimately 
Nepad is based on a trade-off where Africa will receive the much needed foreign investment 
from Northern states8 (mainly the G-8) in exchange for good political and economic 
governance (Breytenbach, 2002).  Good political and economic governance is supposed to be 
reviewed by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) that is directly related to the 
Nepad initiative (Cilliers, 2002).  There are also the African Peace and Security Council 
(APSC) intended to ensure good political and economic governance.  The APSC falls under 
the AU too.  
 
The APSC is supposed to be critical towards, and intervene in countries that do not comply 
with the ideas in the new development programmes for Africa.  Once again South Africa 
occupies a high-power position within the institution.  The country recently secured one of 
the upper-tier seats9 on the APSC (Cornish, 2004a: 16).  A stronger position here will ensure 
that South Africa has more control over the regional and African projects – as is typically 
expected of emerging middle powers.      
 
Another creation of the AU is the Pan African Parliament (PAP) of which South Africa 
recently became the seat.  Before South Africa was awarded the seat it became very clear that 
this goal featured very high on the government’s agenda.  The media even referred to it as 
“the second South African priority at the AU” (the first priority was to obtain the upper-tier 
seat at the APSC) (Cornish, 2004a: 16).  A central focus of South Africa’s intentions with the 
AU, APSC and PAP has been to bring an end to Africa’s many devastating conflicts.  
                                                 
8 Here too I am not judging the validity of this claim, but am only pointing out what was believed will 
happen, or was promised will happen. 
9 There are 5 upper-tier seats and 10 lower ranked seats.  
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Conflict resolution was also linked to South Africa’s foreign policy on the continent and 
formed part of the wider ‘African renaissance’ idea (Malan, 1999).   
 
Peacefully preventing and ending conflict and also creating lasting peace on the African 
continent are essential parts of South Africa’s renaissance plans for Africa.  This is evident in 
the country’s involvement in creating and piloting organs such as the APSC.  Former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo stated during a speech in 1995:  
 
We (South Africa) have a limited capacity, but will, as far as possible, assist in efforts aimed at 
the furtherance world-wide of peace and democracy; human rights; sustainable development; 
protection of the environment; and disarmament (cited in Shaw & Cilliers, 1996). 
 
He also stated in the same speech that Africa was a “priority in the years ahead”.  This 
became evident through South Africa’s involvement in peacekeeping operations as well as 
the facilitation and mediation in peace negotiations on the continent.  Furthermore, South 
Africa has sent numerous peacekeeping forces or peace delegations to various conflict areas 
on the continent including Burundi, Rwanda, Eritrea/Ethiopia and more recently, in the 
Sudan (Crisisweb, 2004; Barber, 2004: 172-173).  The country also often acts as the 
facilitator and mediator for peace negotiations (Bischoff, 2003:184).   
 
South Africa’s drive to create peace on the continent is furthermore reflected in its financial 
contributions made towards such efforts.  The county’s financial contribution to UN peace 
supporting operations is twice that of Nigeria and five times that of Egypt (Shaw & Cilliers, 
1996; Land, 1996).  Furthermore, South Africa also provided financing for AU peace-making 
and keeping on the African continent (Mail & Guardian, 3/10/2003).  But the country’s role 
as mediator between conflicting parties has not been limited to the African continent.  The 
country has also been involved in peace efforts in Northern Ireland and the Middle East.  
 
Indeed, South Africa’s prominent position and leadership aspiration in African organisations 
are not restricted to the African continent.  The country’s involvement, influence and 
leadership aspirations stretch beyond Africa to include the global South as well.  For 
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instance, South Africa chaired the Non Alignment Movement (NAM) from 1998 to 2001 and 
is also an important and influential member of the G-20+, a South-South dialogue forum.  
(Barber, 2004: 155-157; Bond, 2004: 63-65, 77).  The G-20+ then also had what some 
considered a breakthrough in South-South cooperation in global trade reform10.  For 
instance, Mbeki (2003) noted after the failed WTO meeting in Cancun:  
 
Our need and ability to work together was also demonstrated during the 
recent WTO negotiations at Cancun, Mexico.  In this instance, India, Brazil, 
China, South Africa, Nigeria, Argentina, Indonesia and other countries came 
together in the so-called G20+ to advance the interests of the developing 
countries as a whole.  This cooperation will continue.  
 
In addition South Africa has become involved in what can be described as emerging middle 
power alliances.  A prime example is the trilateral India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) forum 
that was launched in June 2003.  The alliance was initiated by South Africa and is considered 
to have a significant political influence in the multilateral arena (White, 2004: 1-4).  IBSA 
aims to create greater South-South cooperation that will lead to better political and economic 
leverage for the South.  This leverage, it is argued, can be used to initiate global trade 
reforms, especially in terms of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).     
 
It is therefore apparent that such forums may serve South African attempts to influence 
global change.  This feature is indicative of an emerging middle power.  In addition, the 
South African government is also keen on the idea that the country should have a permanent 
seat on a reformed UN Security Council (UNSC) (Barber, 2004: 155).  Thereby South Africa 
will be able to represent the developing world in the UNSC.  The UNSC reform issue also 
features in IBSA dialogue.  This comes as no surprise since all three countries desire a 
permanent seat in the UNSC.  Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim even went as far as 
to say that the IBSA states are ‘natural candidates’ for permanent seats (Gruzd, 2004). 
                                                 
10 However, it must be noted that the stability of the alliance is very uncertain, as evidenced by the fact that 
a number of G20+ ‘member’ countries have been lured away from the grouping through bilateral FTA’s 
and trade agreements with the US (Gruzd, 2004). 
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Thus, South Africa is a serious player in Africa and in the South.  The country also displays 
reformist tendencies.  However, it is one thing to act among the South and quite another to 
act amongst the Northern states.  This will become apparent in the next section.   
2.3.2 South Africa’s Global Context and Relationship with the North 
This discussion on post-apartheid South Africa’s relationship with the North revolves 
broadly around two aspects.  In the first instance, the ANC government realised the 
unquestionable importance the North has in South Africa’s short and long-term interests.  In 
other words, Northern support is crucial for South Africa’s emerging middle power role.  
Second, the North recognised the importance and potential benefits of having good relations 
with a Southern emerging middle power like South Africa.  As stated, emerging middle 
powers has a legitimising factor as far as the global hegemonic order is concerned.   
 
As is the case with South African‘s regional and African context, its unique position as a link 
between the developed and developing worlds is very relevant in the country’s relationship 
with the North.  In fact, South Africa’s relationship, role, interests and leadership in and with 
the South could be directly jeopardised by its relationship with the North, as well as the 
amount of support it receives from the North.  This is where the North’s importance to South 
Africa becomes apparent in a number of areas.  
 
First, South Africa’s new governing order quickly realised the importance of the North to its 
own interests, as well as its regional and global position.  Former ANC Secretary General, 
Alfred Nzo mentioned in 1996 the “realities we dare not ignore” in reference to the US and 
G-7 as “the power bases of the world today, and essential to our economic well being” 
(Barber, 2004: 98).  Some of South Africa’s leading economic partners are located in the 
North, especially in terms of the European Union (EU) and the U.S.  In 1995 the four leading 
export markets for South Africa in terms of individual states were all located in the 
developed world, specifically the U.K., U.S., Japan and Germany (Ahwireng-Obeng & 
McGowan, 1998: 7; Barber, 2004: 163).  As such, South Africa had to adapt to global 
standards and practices such as promoting neo-liberal economic policies.  Spence (2001: 4-5) 
states that: 
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A major preoccupation of the Mandela administration’s foreign policy has been to weld South 
Africa’s economy into a global market place which rewards liberalisation and deregulation and 
penalises rigidity, inflexibility in the labour market and continued state control over particular 
assets.    
 
And, in order to draw much needed FDI South Africa realised it was necessary for “the 
creation of an enabling environment compromised of good governance and economic 
performance in line with the so called Washington Consensus”.  In doing so South Africa 
followed all sorts of neo-liberal economic policies and reforms, such as the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programmes, to bring its domestic economy in line 
with the global norm.  Williams & Taylor (2000) showed how the ANC government moved 
away from its more social democratic policies to institute neo-liberal economic policies and 
reforms.  But South Africa also promoted neo-liberal policies in the rest of Africa as a means 
to achieve good economic governance, as Nepad is clearly an example of example.  This is 
where the second point of Northern importance comes in; that is to say that Northern 
approval and support for South Africa’s emerging middle power position could reinforce the 
country’s legitimacy and authority in Africa and the South.  
 
As mentioned, South Africa’s role as go-between has been Africa’s connection with the 
North and has represented them there on issues such as aid, FDI and debt.  In turn, South 
Africa conveys the wishes and position of the North to the South.  This is not where it stops.  
South Africa is actively promoting the same economic policies, reforms and standards11 that 
it has implemented domestically, to the rest of Africa and the South.  In terms of Africa it has 
been clearly reflected through South African initiatives such as Nepad.  As far as the South is 
concerned, in 1997 South Africa invited Northern representatives to attend NAM meetings 
(Barber, 2004: 160).  This invitation, the first of its kind, was extended to the US, UK, 
France and the EU.  If the North does deliver on their promises and ‘reward’ political and 
economic reform in Africa, South Africa’s position as regional leader should be 
strengthened.  My argument is that South Africa, as the promoter of the economic and 
political reforms (i.e. Nepad, APSC etc.), should receive greater cooperation from African 
                                                 
11 Such as the Washington consensus and other neo-liberal policies 
 37
countries if they (African countries) are rewarded for their reforms.  Of course the opposite is 
also likely and South Africa can lose a lot of its credibility as a leader and emerging middle 
power.  Also, the amount of Northern support (financial and other) that Africa receives will 
influence South Africa’s regional integration and the degree to which it enjoys regional 
cooperation.   
 
The above-mentioned is thus directly linked to the third important point.  The North is 
expected to be the main source of financing for South Africa’s grand, turnaround schemes for 
Africa.  According to Bischoff (2003: 188) South Africa wants to change the “African policy 
environment in favour of the creation of conditions for wealth and security”.  This is to be 
done partly by making use of aid from the Western donor community.   
 
For instance, in the case of Nepad the G-8 countries made investment ‘promises’ to Africa.  
Initially Nepad was based on the idea that Africa would receive US$ 64 billion annually from 
the G-8 states and it was furthermore aimed to achieve and sustain an average annual GDP 
growth rate of 7% for the next 15 years – pertaining to all participating African countries 
(Breytenbach, 2002; Dahl, 2003).  However, in July 2002 the G-8 only pledged $6 billion a 
year (Matlosa, 2002: 8).  This also brings in doubt if the targeted 7% growth-rate is 
obtainable since it was projected on a US$ 64 million inflow.  Nevertheless, the point is 
South Africa desperately needs Northern support for its leadership position and initiatives in 
Africa.  
 
The importance of Northern support also extends to South Africa’s other emerging middle 
power initiatives, specifically South Africa’s global economic reformist initiatives or 
rhetoric. There is also the matter of South Africa’s global leadership aspirations, especially in 
terms of international institutions – for instance, the desire for permanent UN Security 
Council membership.  Since the most powerful members in the UN are mostly Northern 
states, and if there ever is UN reform, Northern support will be decisive if South Africa is 
ever to have a permanent seat.   
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Despite this, South Africa has to a large extent enjoyed preferential treatment from Northern 
states.  When compared to other African and developing states in general, South Africa is 
one of the few that receive Northern favouritism.  The favouritism evident in the fact that 
post-1994 South Africa found itself included in a growing number of highly favoured places 
and situations, as well as in the company of powerful and elite people groups and 
organisations.   
 
For instance, Nelson Mandela attended the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland in 
1999 (Barber, 2004: 161).  Thabo Mbeki is also no stranger to Davos.  This forum is then 
also predominantly attended by only the richest governments and companies.  In addition, 
South Africa became a regular attendee at World Bank, IMF and G-8 meetings.  For 
example, the country attended the G-8 summits in Kananaskis, Canada (2002) and in Evian 
(2003) (Bond, 2004: 9-10, 51).   
 
South Africa being favoured by the North and its institutions did not go unnoticed in the 
South and a great deal of criticism has been directed against the actions and policies of the 
South African government.  Areas that particularly drew the attention of critics are those that 
are perceived as the government’s double standards in terms of dealing with the North and 
representing the South.  For instance, the government is accused of “talking left” but in 
actual fact is “walking right” (Bond, 2004; Saul, 2004).  Also, the question has been asked 
with whom the government is actually siding, North or South?  And, to what extend is South 
Africa committed to its African obligations and promises?   
 
Instead of being regarded as the ‘champion of Africa’, South Africa is accused of acting in its 
own interests at the expense of Africa and it is no mystery why.  At the WTO, South Africa 
was allowed to attend the highly controversial and exclusive ‘Green Room Meeting’ in 1999.  
It is interesting to note that the only other Southern state present at that meeting was fellow 
IBSA member and emerging middle power, India.  This could be further verification for the 
idea that the North are searching for Southern states, or emerging middle powers that can add 
to legitimising the global status quo.  Furthermore, former South African Minister of Trade 
and Industry, Alec Erwin accepted the equally controversial ‘Friend of the Chair’ position at 
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the WTO in 2001.  The Friend of the Chair position allows the holder to negotiate WTO rules 
(Bond, 2004: 52).  
  
While the level of inclusion has been testimony to the North’s acknowledgement and 
approval of South Africa’s emerging middle power status, it is necessary to ask why Pretoria 
receives such approval.  What makes South Africa special to the North?    
 
South Africa’s peaceful transition to democracy and the consolidation thereof, as well as the 
country’s relative economic success (compared to its African peers) all play a part.  Bischoff 
(2003: 185) says that South Africa’s progressive constitution, stable government and open 
democracy have left a favourable impression on the Northern states.  Moreover, South Africa 
is a “magnet for those Western states that look towards relations with a reliably 
democratising South”.  In 1994 the US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa said that “there 
is inspiration and hope in the pragmatic miracle of South Africa’s negotiated transition to 
democracy” (Martin, 2002: 250).  Thus, there are those that view the country as the last hope 
for the poverty stricken and war ridden continent.  Some also view South Africa as an 
example for other African states.  This is evident in a statement by US President Bush in 
2003: “I look forward to going to South Africa, where I’ll meet with elected leaders who are 
firmly committed to economic reforms in a nation that has become a major force for regional 
peace and stability” (Bond, 2004: 30). 
   
Barber (2004: 150) notes that South Africa is “committed to Western-inspired values of 
democracy and good governance”.  Thus, in South Africa the North has found an ally in the 
South to promote pro-Northern ideals to the South.  Additionally, the global order (or what 
Cox (1996: 243) referred to as the hegemonic order) is of such a nature that it predominantly 
serves the interests of the North.  It is then here where South Africa’s importance to the 
North is highlighted, while another emerging middle power characteristic is also displayed.  
By promoting and representing Northern ideals in the developing world, South Africa is 
legitimising the global status quo.  In the specific case of emerging middle powers the 
following is said: 
 
 40
They are legitimisers, because given their privileged positions in the global political economy 
and regional political economies they benefit relatively from the institutionalisation of (the 
inequality associated with) the current neo-liberal hegemony.  But, true to their conflict-
management proclivities, middle powers assist in making the ideology, values and practices of 
the hegemonic order that facilitate and mask global inequality appear more natural and 
universal (Jordaan, 2003: 169).  
 
So, it is clear that this is precisely the situation with South Africa.  As mentioned the country 
has been seen as the economic hope for Africa.  Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan (1998: 30-
31) argued that “there is increasing evidence that the United States, the other G-7 nations, the 
European Union and the Bretton Woods institutions see South Africa’s private sector as the 
saviour of Africa”.  There are however other economic aspects where South Africa can also 
play a useful role towards helping Northern powers.  These aspects are of greater concern to 
Northern self-interest.  South Africa’s influences (especially in economic terms) in Southern 
Africa have been discussed.  Combining this with South Africa’s role as mediator between 
North and South, it makes the country the ideal point of entry to Southern African markets.  
Martin (2002: 87) then also states that France has viewed South Africa as the ideal 
“intermediary and power broker” for Southern African market penetration.  Northern 
economic interests may also be extended to Africa’s conflicts.   
 
The UN and donor nations (predominantly Northern states) are keen to devolve peacekeeping 
responsibilities to African states (Bischoff, 2004: 192).  In other words, it lessens their 
responsibilities.  Northern institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO recognised the 
role that South Africa can play in conflict resolution on the continent.  They also support 
South Africa in its peacekeeping operations in Africa (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998: 
30).  South Africa’s involvement and efforts to conflict resolution by means of  peacekeeping 
operations, as well as facilitating peace negotiations and mediation have been discussed 
(Mail & Guardian, 03/10/2003).  There are also the South African driven organs such as the 
African Peace and Security Council that are supposed to resolve and prevent conflicts on the 
continent.  Thus, South Africa presents the North with an opportunity to decrease their 
peacekeeping activities and responsibilities on the continent.   
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It is therefore clear that South Africa’s emerging middle power position is widely accepted 
and supported by the developed world.  It has placed the country in the position to pursue 
global reformist agendas through forums such as IBSA, UNCTAD, WTO, ECOSOC, and the 
G20+.  Conversely, it was also stated that South Africa cannot display and voice complete 
disregard for orthodox and mostly Northern global economic and political practices and 
standards.  Otherwise they may risk a Northern backlash.  
2.4. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to show how South Africa’s particular kind of middle power 
manifests in the country’s policies and actions.  Through the application of the appropriate 
criteria it was shown that the country conforms to the behavioural characteristics of an 
emerging middle power.  This is evident from South Africa’s policies, actions and other 
features associated with South Africa’s unique position between the global North and global 
South.   
 
Being an emerging middle power necessarily means that South Africa holds a particular 
significance for its immediate region and continent, but also for the international system.  
Furthermore, it should be considered that this ‘particular significance’ means that South 
Africa also holds a certain influence and authority in relation to its region, continent and the 
international system.  Therefore, the combination of factors that contributed to the country’s 
emerging middle power status is also the source of the different types of power South Africa 
has in relation to other states.  Under power we can of course include the structural and hard 
relational power South Africa holds over some Southern states, especially states in its 
immediate region.  But there is also symbolic or soft power, as it was defined in Chapter I.  
South Africa’s soft power and its resources are then also the main concern of this study.  It is 
believed that South Africa has a considerable amount of soft power that supports its 
initiatives, position and leadership aspirations.  Thus, as discussed in the following chapter, 
South Africa’s soft power and emerging middlepowership are inseparable.   
 
This chapter mentioned how the promotion and protection of human rights were central to 
the apartheid struggle.  Then there was the relatively peaceful, negotiated transformation to 
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democracy.  Following on this was the internationally expected, but also self-assumed role as 
protector of international human rights.  This spilled over into South Africa trying its hand at 
addressing global economic injustice, thereby displaying reformist leanings and acquiring the 
title of ‘champion for the South’.  Furthermore, South Africa offered or was approached to 
act as conflict negotiation mediator, facilitator and peacekeeper in various conflict situations 
on the continent and elsewhere.    
 
These all contributed to enhancing South Africa’s global image and moral authority.  It had 
the effect that the country received a lot of voluntary cooperation and acceptance of its 
authority regarding certain aspects.  In other words, the above-mentioned factors enhanced 
South Africa’s soft power.   
 
In addition, the Northern states were attracted by South Africa’s democratic transformation 
and the acceptance and implementation of what is considered Northern or Western neo-
liberal policies and ideals.  The country was also seen as an example for other Southern 
states.  It could prove that Northern ideals and policies can work in the South if implemented 
correctly.  South Africa also has the potential to legitimise the global status quo that is 
mainly based on Northern values and ideals.  Also, Northern states have a mostly negative 
image in the South and elsewhere.  For instance, they are perceived as imperialistic and 
oppressive.  Being seen on friendly terms with a state that carries great global moral authority 
and acts and claims to be the champion of the South cannot hurt.  For these reasons South 
Africa received the North’s support and acceptance.   
 
Thus, although South Africa has no structural and hard power over the Northern states, it has 
a considerable amount of soft power to wield.  Soft power is therefore of great importance in 
South Africa’s dealings with countries from the North and the South.  South Africa then also 
has an interest to sustain and to further develop its soft power.   
 
However, there are also serious cracks forming in South Africa’s moral authority, leadership 
and soft power, especially in regards to how it is perceived by African and Southern states.  
So, South Africa is faced with the problem of how to enhance its soft power.  This question 
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forms the focus of the next chapter.  The importance of soft power for South Africa, as well 
as the potential ways for enhancing its soft power is discussed in relation to the country’s bid 
to host the 2010 Soccer World Cup.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE 2010 BID AS A MEANS TO INCREASE SOFT POWER 
 “I am also privileged to convey to you our deep felt gratitude for giving the peoples of Africa the 
possibility to host the Soccer World Cup.  The historic decision you took has made the unequivocal 
statement that you, the leaders of world soccer, are firmly of the view that Africa's time has come!” 
“We have come to Zurich together to convey the seriousness with which we take your decision that 
Africa should host the 2010 Soccer World Cup.  In front of you, we reiterate our commitment to 
ensure that indeed all Africa shares a common sense of participation in a World Cup hosted by 
Africa.  With all due humility, we undertake that as hosts of the Soccer World Cup, we would ensure 
that our continent shares a common sense of empowering achievement at what we would do to ensure 
that we sustain the pride of Fifa” 
Thabo Mbeki, 2004.  
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The central focus of this chapter deals with South Africa’s bid for the 2010 Fifa World Cup.  
The aim of this case study is to show how South Africa used its Fifa bid in an attempt to 
enhance its soft power.  It will be argued that South Africa has projected certain chosen 
images of itself with the intention of showcasing the country on a global scale.  As a result, 
the South African approach to this challenge will also be discussed.  The objective is not to 
qualify whether these attempts have been successful in boosting South Africa’s soft power.  
The aim is rather to establish if South Africa did attempt to boost its soft power.   
 
The first part of the discussion will show how South Africa has been boosting, or rather has 
been attempting to increase its symbolic/soft power since the early 1990s.  The idea is to 
create a better understanding of why it is believed that bidding and hosting Fifa 2010 is 
another means in South Africa’s search for greater soft power.  I will then create a context 
where it will be illustrated why soft power is important to South Africa.  The preceding 
chapter did touch on these aspects but here it will be examined in greater detail.  A better 
background on the importance of soft power for South Africa will support the reasoning 
behind the country’s attempt to portray itself in certain ways that will enhance its soft power.  
The attention will then turn to the Fifa 2010 World Cup bid campaign.  
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3.2. SOUTH AFRICA, MEGA-EVENTS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SOFT POWER  
Chapter I identified the potential gains governments attach to bidding and hosting mega-
events.  International relations scholars argue that the gains include identity building and 
signalling, marketing, developmental benefits, and promoting democracy and human rights.  
They also believe that more and more developing states are buying into these ideas (Black & 
Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Cornelissen, 2004a).  South Africa is one example where this 
view holds true.  But before this is discussed it is necessary to again point out that this study 
is mainly concerned with the potential marketing benefits of mega-events.  Accordingly it is 
where the focus will remain.  
3.2.1 The Importance of Soft Power for South Africa 
It has been established that South Africa is an emerging middle power.  As such, the country 
has various regional and global aspirations, initiatives, and goals that it would like to achieve 
and has to support.  These are of course all tied to its own long-term self-interests.  The 
question is then how South Africa, with limited hard power and resources to rely on, will 
achieve its objectives and strengthen its own global position?  Here I would like to argue that 
South Africa, as is the case with other middle powers, has to rely on soft power to a large 
extent.   
 
The motivation for this is that although middle powers lack the power and resources of major 
powers12, they still possess limited influence over global issues.  The source for this 
influence partly resides in soft power.  Soft power is viewed as a non-coercive means to 
either establish voluntary cooperation, or to achieve own or collective gain.  This is done by 
means of attractive and legitimate authority and power, as well as other intangible aspects 
such as culture, ideology, institutions and foreign policy (section 1.4.1.).  If we for instance 
consider emerging middle powers with their tendency to display a reformist agenda, it 
becomes apparent how important it is to enjoy voluntary international cooperation, respect 
and prestige.  And this is largely achieved through soft power.  
 
                                                 
12 In Chapter II it was stated that, in contrast to hegemons, middle powers lack decisive structural power 
throughout the political spectrum (Black, 1997: 107; Cooper, 1997: 6).  Also, unlike hegemons they do not 
hold the economic and military backing that is essential for determining (or at least influencing) the desired 
outcomes in various instances.   
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Chapter II showed that South Africa has reformist agendas in terms of changing the nature of 
political and economic governance in Africa.  To an extent South Africa is also addressing 
global economic reforms.  Accordingly, South Africa has to deal with both the North and 
South.  But when compared to the Northern states, South Africa is outdone in terms of 
structural power and military and economic capability.  As a result, the potential influence of 
soft power becomes more important.  When compared to Africa and others in the developing 
world, South Africa has relatively strong relational power.  This does not mean that its soft 
power is less needed in dealing with Africa.   
 
In Africa the success rate of South African initiatives such as Nepad and its leadership  role 
will definitely be influenced by how legitimate and attractive its power, authority, culture and 
ideology is viewed by other African states.  South Africa may be a giant compared to the 
others in the region and the continent but it is still only an emerging middle power.  
Ultimately it cannot force others to comply.  It then becomes clear that South Africa has to 
rely to a large degree on the voluntary cooperation of other African states.  In other words, 
African nations must want what South Africa wants.  To achieve this South African authority 
and leadership must be perceived as legitimate and committed to Africa.  It is here where 
potential ‘cracks’ can form in terms of how Africa perceives South Africa’s moral authority 
and leadership.  As put by Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan (1998), is South Africa a partner 
of Africa or just another self-interested hegemon?  To increase its stature South Africa has to 
rely on its soft power.   
 
As far as its soft power in Africa is concerned, it has been noted that there may be a growing 
resentment against South Africa (Bischoff, 2003: 191, 196).  The reasons for the resentment 
are numerous and range from suspicion and fear of South Africa’s economic and political 
power to its relationship with the North.   
 
The great concern should be that it is South Africa’s power that is perceived to be a threat.  It 
is stated that the other SADC countries fear South Africa’s political and economic ‘giantism’ 
(Mail & Guardian, 22/08/2003).  South Africa’s commitment and its pledge to develop 
Africa, and other associated promises and initiatives, are often questioned by African states.  
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Martin (2002: 40) said that South Africa’s unilateral trade negotiations (for example with the 
EU) lead other SADC members to question the concept of “SADC first”.  Gruzd (2004) 
stated that South Africa’s involvement in IBSA and consequently, the time and effort it spent 
on Brazil and India instead of Africa are points of controversy for African states. 
 
Another great problem is that South Africa’s ‘African identity’ comes into question.  As can 
be expected, the fact that South Africa is the initiator of the IBSA forum only added to these 
suspicions.  Then there is the preferential treatment South Africa enjoys from the North.  The 
effect this has had is that South Africa has been accused of having double standards.  The 
situation becomes problematic for South Africa when the above mentioned is combined with 
the country’s significant trade, economic and political power in Africa, as well as its 
implementation and promotion of neo-liberal economic policies and mostly Western 
orientated political institutions.  The result is that the country is rather perceived as ‘the 
North’ among ‘the South’ than a fellow Southern ally (McGowan & Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998: 
169-170).   
 
In Africa, South Africa may still be able to incorporate limited hard economic and military 
power resources to get others to comply.  These resources are basically non-existent when 
dealing with the North.  It is here too that soft power comes into play – especially in the way 
South Africa is observed by Northern states and institutions.  Therefore, by boosting its 
image in certain ways, South Africa can enhance its global appeal.  
 
As cited, part of South Africa’s attraction to the North is in the way it stands out from the rest 
of Africa and others in the South.  Here, I refer to its relatively successful economic 
conditions, peaceful democratic political environment and economic policy transformation.  
To a degree South Africa is also seen as an ally in the South.  South Africa thus has an 
interest in maintaining such an image in the North.   
 
If not, South Africa will lose Northern interest and support and won’t be able (or allowed to, 
for that matter) to participate in and on the level it does in the various Northern dominated 
organisations.  South Africa’s credibility as intermediary between the North and South may 
 48
suffer.  South Africa also needs credible and legitimate authority in the eyes of the North to 
pursue global economic reforms.  Otherwise South Africa may experience a Northern 
backlash if the North deems South African lead reforms as illegitimate or threatening to their 
interests.  The situation is further complicated by certain global developments.  Bischoff 
(2003: 186) notes: 
 
However, the current international system is characterised by lurches towards American-led 
unilateralism and the diminution of multilateralism.  This weakening of multilateralism reduces 
South Africa’s potential for playing the role of facilitator and bold reformer, be it as a leading 
force for dialogue with the North through the Nepad or via the NAM on, say, the Middle East. 
 
This will directly affect the country’s position and power in Africa and the South.  For 
instance, if Pretoria cannot secure any Northern support for its African initiatives it will also 
not be able to live up to its African obligations, roles and promises.  The renaissance may be 
‘African’ but it will not be successful without Northern support and financing.  This will then 
also affect South Africa’s legitimacy and authority on the African continent.   
 
Herein lies the paradox.  South Africa needs to keep the support and inclusion from the North 
to enable them to keep to their African commitments and promises.  On the other hand, it is 
exactly this high level of Northern interest and interaction with South Africa that causes other 
African states to question the country’s loyalty and authority.  So, while South Africa needs 
to enhance its soft power in both the North and the South, it will require different techniques 
and will have to include the projection of different images in each instance.   
 
But what is clear is that soft power has an important role to play in maintaining South 
Africa’s emerging middle power behaviour and goals.  The question then how is South 
Africa is going about boosting its soft power? 
3.2.2 History of Mega-Events in South Africa 
It was mentioned that South Africa’s moral authority and soft power has its origins in the 
country’s apartheid struggle; peaceful transition to democracy; image as global protector of 
human rights; and peace negotiator/keeper/mediator.  These aspects simultaneously support 
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South Africa’s emerging middle power status to a certain extent, as well as supply the 
country with international prestige.  In turn this adds to South Africa’s moral authority, 
which is the soft power Pretoria is in a continuous pursuit to maintain and boost.  The 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) states one of its main principles as “promoting a 
positive image of South Africa” (DFA, 2003: 14).  The government then also recognises 
mega-events (or hallmark events) as potential sources for achieving such an objective, as 
stated in the South Africa Yearbook 2003/4 (GCIS, 2003/4):   
The Government has, since the late 1990s, been actively imaging, branding and marketing 
South Africa, both directly and by supporting initiatives like…hosting hallmark events, and 
creating the International Investment Council, International Marketing Council and 
International Task Force on Information Society and Development. 
 
Some of these hallmark events include the 1998 UN Commission on Human Rights; the 
Commonwealth Conference in 1999; the 13th International AIDS conference in Durban, July 
2000; the UN Conference against Racism in 2001; and the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) that was held in Johannesburg in 2002.  It is obvious that these events 
all have one thing in common: they all have to do with highly publicised international 
normative issues.  Therefore they fit neatly in South Africa’s ‘moral authority’ image and 
role and could also enhance this image.  
 
But although these events are relatively large-scale events, they do not come close to drawing 
the international interest and audience numbers major sporting events do.  And as stated by 
President Nelson Mandela in 1996: “Sport is probably the most effective means of 
communication in the modern world, bypassing both verbal and written communication and 
reaching directly out to billions of people worldwide” (Beck, 2004:77).  It is also quite clear 
that the South African government bought the idea that hosting major sporting events are 
great marketing platforms – as is evident from the considerable amount of international 
sporting events the country hosted or bid for from 1995 onwards.  
 
Already in 1995 South Africa hosted the Rugby World Cup.  This was followed by the 
Africa Cup of Nations in 1996; the African Games in 1999; and the 2003 Cricket World Cup.  
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The successful hosting of these events prompted South Africa to bid for the biggest of them 
all, namely the 2004 Olympic Games and the 2006 Fifa World Cup.  Both these bids were 
however unsuccessful.   
 
The huge significance South Africa attaches to these events are furthermore evident from the 
establishment of the South African Sports Commission (SASC) that started operation in 
April 2000.  The commission has also received a greater budget in 2003 and some of its 
leading responsibilities are all focussed around the bidding and hosting of mega sports 
events.  This is apparent from the South African Yearbook 2003/2004 that names some of the 
responsibilities as:  
 
Improving the quality of international events hosted by South Africa; enhancing the bidding for 
and hosting of international events; and assisting federations and organisations that have been 
granted permission to host international events.  
 
Furthermore, the government also established the International Marketing Council of South 
Africa (IMC) in August 2000 with the main purpose to “create a positive and compelling 
brand image for South Africa” (IMC, nd13).  Among other initiatives and goals this includes 
exploiting ‘significant worldwide events’ to full extent for their marketing potential.  In 
February 2003 Yvonne Johnston, CEO of the IMC, stated in a speech to the Sport and 
Recreation Conference that:  
 
I see the business benefits, the entertainment benefits and the fact that sporting events provide a 
brilliant marketing opportunity to showcase South Africa to the world …sporting events allow 
countries to showcase their landscapes, the people, the infrastructure.  They also allow one to 
develop the softer issues such as national pride which ultimately drives the hard issues such as 
tourism, trade and investment and influence international relations (Johnston, 2003).  
 
All of this has led to South Africa’s bid for what is considered to be the international sporting 
event with the largest spectator audience.  It also equals the Olympic Games as the most 
demanding event in regards of infrastructure, technology, resources and plain logistics.  
                                                 
13 No date was available but the information was retrieved from the website in October 2004.  
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South Africa’s bid for this event, the Fifa 2010 World Cup, was then also announced as the 
successful bid on 15 May 2004 in Zurich.  
3.3. SOUTH AFRICA’S BID FOR FIFA 2010  
3.3.1 Overview  
To understand the significance of South Africa’s bid for 2010 it should be seen against a 
background of South Africa’s sports history.  During 1964 South Africa was suspended from 
Fifa.  In 1974 Fifa expelled South Africa from the organisation (Griffiths, 2000: 78).  Besides 
the universal objections against apartheid, the absurd apartheid-inspired management of 
South African soccer became an offensive embarrassment for Fifa.  For instance, in 1963 
South Africa announced that it would be sending an all-white team to Fifa 1966 in England 
and an all-black side to Fifa 1970 in Mexico (Mail & Guardian, 06/11/2003).  
 
The country’s expulsion from Fifa was part of a global campaign against apartheid that was 
aimed at the complete isolation of South Africa.  Along with the country’s diplomatic and 
commercial isolation, South Africa was also excluded from most other international sporting 
events and bodies.  During the 2010 bid campaign Thabo Mbeki acknowledged the role Fifa 
played in fighting apartheid.  In a speech to Fifa he said “thank you Fifa for what you did to 
help us achieve our freedom!”  (Mbeki, 2004).  
 
The noted re-inclusion of South Africa in the international community immediately opened 
doors for South African sport as well.  In fact, sport has been one of the spheres that has 
enjoyed the quickest international re-admittance and acceptance.  Already in 1992 the 
national cricket team competed in the Cricket World Cup in Australia, while the national 
soccer team (Bafana Bafana) played international matches on home soil (Griffiths, 2000: 16-
17).  When the country competed in the 1992 Barcelona Games it was of great symbolic 
importance.  By allowing South Africa back into the Olympic Community the world 
acknowledged that the country was once again accepted as part of the international 
community.  Accordingly, the importance of sport to South Africa’s foreign policy gained 
new heights, as noted in the preceding section. 
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The international soccer body, Fifa, also welcomed South Africa – now with its inclusive and 
multi-racial soccer teams and management – back into its ranks.  Fifa membership also 
meant that South Africa could be a potential host of the World Cup.  Hence, in October 1997, 
South Africa announced its intention to bid for Fifa 2006 (Griffiths, 2000: 81).   
South Africa was however not the only African country with such aspirations.  Morocco, 
Ghana, Egypt and Nigeria also jumped on the bandwagon.  At the end, all except Morocco 
and South Africa withdrew their bids in order to put forward a single and stronger African 
bid (Mail & Guardian, 30/06/2000).  The final round of voting saw South Africa going up 
against Germany.  The controversial announcement of the winner took place in July 2000.  
The controversy sprouted from South Africa’s marginal defeat (12 votes to 11) when New 
Zealander and Fifa Executive member, Charlie Dempsey, abstained from the vote.  In 
accordance with his Oceania Football Confederation’s resolution, Dempsey was supposed to 
vote for South Africa.  This would have meant that Fifa President Sepp Blatter would have 
had to cast the deciding vote.  He was openly in favour of an African World Cup.  
Whatever the real reasons behind Dempsey’s choice, the fact remains that once again a 
Northern country was chosen at the expense of an African one.  This became a highly 
publicised issue that caused Fifa to reconsider its voting structures.  In 2002 the Fifa 
executive committee announced that it would be introducing a rotation system in which each 
football confederation would have a chance to host a football World Cup.  Fifa went further 
and promised the 2010 World Cup to the Confederation of African Football (CAF).  
Cornelissen (2004b: 1299) argued that because this decision from Fifa had its origins in 
“South Africa’s misfortune during the 2006 campaign, it could perhaps be seen as an early 
diplomatic triumph for the country”.  Thus South Africa pursued the 2010 World Cup 
without hesitation.  The bid for this event was officially launched in April 2003 (Mail & 
Guardian, 30/04/2003).   
 
South Africa was in an advantageous position during this second attempt at the World Cup.  
Its competition was limited to African countries including Morocco, Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia.  And South Africa had an obvious advantage over the African contenders when 
considering the country’s emerging middle power status and relative economic and political 
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leverage on the continent.  Besides, South Africa beat England and almost Germany during 
the 2006 campaign.  Regardless of these factors, South Africa did not leave anything to 
chance and managed to propose a bid that compared with the best in the world.    
 
No where else was this more evident than in the technical report released by Fifa prior to the 
voting (Cooper, 2004; Gleeson 2004: 21).  The release of the technical report itself was an 
unprecedented decision since it had never been done before.  It would also give the country 
that performed the best in the technical evaluation a clear advantage over the others.  The 
reason for this is that meeting Fifa’s requirements are a major influencing factor when 
selecting the successful candidate.  In this instance South Africa’s report placed the country 
head and shoulders above the rest.  This action by Fifa in itself may have pointed to a bias in 
its preference for South Africa.     
 
The technical requirements are not the only criteria according to which the various football 
federations’ representatives vote.  This was evident from the final results of the voting that 
took place on May 15, 2004.  In the final round of voting South Africa received 14 votes, 
Morocco 10, and Egypt none (AllAfrica, 17/05/2004b).  Thus, although South Africa was 
well in the lead with the technical report, Egypt second followed by Morocco in third place, 
the latter still secured 10 votes.  A further point of contention for the South African side was 
that the four African votes in Fifa (Cameroon, Botswana, Mali and Tunisia) all went to 
Morocco (Sunday Times, 16/05/2004).  What made this even more significant was that prior 
to voting day, the South Africa side was confident that they had secured at least two of the 
four African votes, namely that of Mali and Botswana (Mokoena & Hadebe, 2004b: 25).  
 
Thus, besides technical requirements, decisions also need to fit into the broader context of 
personal relationships as well as political and economic relations that may have very little to 
do with the Soccer World Cup.  In the case of Mali, the country’s president personally asked 
the Fifa boss beforehand to vote for South Africa.  This gesture was in return for Pretoria 
financially helping Mali to host the 2002 African Cup of Nations.  For reasons still unclear  
Mali’s Amadou Diakite had voted for Morocco instead.  The Fifa representative from 
Botswana, Ismail Bhamjee, is a former South African.  Furthermore, Botswana and South 
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Africa are good neighbours with secure relations and shared interests.  It is also believed that 
Botswana’s very lucrative tourism industry would directly benefit from a World Cup being 
hosted in South Africa.  Regardless of Botswana’s interests Bhamjee had a personal score to 
settle, since South Africa did not support him in his campaign for the presidency of the CAF 
(Dailynews, 23/01/2004; Mokoena & Hadebe, 2004b: 25).   
 
Other conditions that have influenced the voting process are found in historical and political 
ties as well as economic interests.  This is what had caused France and Spain to explicitly 
support Morocco’s bid (Mail & Guardian, 06/11/2003).  Prior to the vote South Africa had 
received open support from Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (Pressly, 2004).  
Germany has been one of South Africa’s top trading partners.  Brazil’s president Lula da 
Silva had also pledged his country’s support.  What is of importance is that Brazilian-South 
African diplomatic and economic relations have grown in recent years, especially since both 
are members of the IBSA forum.  Clearly this relationship must have played a role in Brazil’s 
siding with South Africa.  Danny Jordaan, the CEO for the Bid Committee in the 2006 
campaign, had also remained in this position for the 2010 bid.  Accordingly he brought along 
the extensive contacts and relationships that he had established.   
 
In the 2010 bid South Africa had built forth on the 2006 networks and excellent technical 
record.  In addition, Cornelissen (2004b: 1301) pointed out that the general 2006 bid theme 
of which ‘Africa’ formed the cornerstone, was continued in 2010.  This theme went on to 
highlight that ‘Africa’s time has come’ (McCullough, 1999).  As is further discussed in the 
next section, the idea that ‘It is Africa’s Time’ has been a crucial part of the South African 
bid.  For instance, after South Africa was announced as the 2010 host nation, Fifa President 
Sepp Blatter, announced that “it is the beginning of a new era in Africa, in the development 
of football in Africa...it is a very strong sign to the whole world that we trust Africa” 
(Obayiuwana, 2004).  
 
Chapter I discussed the potential marketing opportunities and potential resources of power 
inherent in the bidding and hosting of mega-events.  Bidding for mega-events is a costly 
endeavour and some would argue that an unsuccessful bid is money wasted.  This was clearly 
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the case after England’s failed 2006 Fifa bid attempt when the Minister of Sport referred to 
the costs involved as a ‘waste’ (Cornelissen, 2004a: 51).  On the other hand, there are also 
those who believe that regardless of whether a bid is successful or not, it still presents an 
opportunity to market and project chosen images of the relevant country.  For instance, when 
Morocco lost the 2010 bid, Saad Kettani, the head of the unsuccessful bid stated that: 
 
We’re not disappointed because we ran a worthy campaign.  Billions of TV viewers saw the 
quality of our presentation yesterday but the final decision is made by 24 people (AllAfrica, 
17/05/2004a).  
 
The Moroccans still believed that they reached intended target audiences and that the money 
spent on the bid campaign was in actual fact long-term marketing expenditures that would 
pay off in the future.  This is exactly the view of the South African government, as pointed 
out in the preceding section.  As was the case with bidding and hosting sporting mega-events 
in general, the South African side believed the Fifa 2010 bid to be an excellent marketing 
platform for the country.  The questions then remain; how and what did South Africa market?  
Furthermore; why and to whom was the marketing done?  
  
What I would like to show in the following three sections is how South Africa used its Fifa 
bid in an attempt to enhance its soft power.  The argument is based on the idea that South 
Africa projected certain chosen images of itself that Pretoria assumed would have a 
favourable effect on how the country is perceived.  Although these images were projected to 
the entire international community, these were intended for specific ‘audiences’.  The images 
are also closely related to the foreign policy rhetoric and goals of the South African 
government.  Therefore, the bidding process itself has been intended to serve political and 
economic ideals (Gratton & Taylor, 2000; Hiller, 2000; Roche, 2000).  
 
Although these images are very much interweaved, I argue that three broad categories can be 
identified in the South Africa bid for the 2010 games.  These images, in no particular order 
are firstly, ‘African Identity/Africa’s Benefactor’; secondly, ‘Bridge Builder’;  and thirdly, 
‘Efficient, Capable, Leading Country’.  As far as was possible the following data are 
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discussed in chronological order and is mostly presented as reflected in the media, 
government sources and 2010 Bid Committee over the period January 2003 to June 2004. 
3.3.2 African Identity/Africa’s Benefactor  
The ANC’s rise to power in South Africa was largely based on their prominent Third World 
credentials (Saul, 2004: 78).  Therefore, it can hardly be contested that the ANC had a clear 
‘African identity’ during the apartheid struggle.  This is then also one image the ANC would 
and could not sacrifice.  This was evident from this statement made shortly after they came to 
power in 1994: “we share great pride in being African.  Our only desire is to contribute to the 
great African story, to the well being of our continent” (Barber, 2004: 171).   
 
Ten years later these two images still featured prominently during South Africa’s bid for the 
2010 World Cup.  South Africa made sure that its ‘unmistakeable African identity’ and ‘how 
much it will mean and contribute to the continent if South Africa is to host Fifa 2010’ was 
constantly reflected side by side.  The reasons for this vary.  For one, the 2010 World Cup 
had been guaranteed to be hosted in Africa.  As a result, the bidding nations had to be able to 
show just how ‘African’ they are.  Failing to show this could count against the bidding 
nations – as was evident from the Moroccan approach to the bid.  To gain advantage, the 
Moroccan bid focussed heavily on their close proximity, history and relations to Europe.  
However, some believed that in doing so Morocco was distancing itself from Africa 
(Maphumulo, 2004: 59).  Also, as stated by Rathbone (2003) “Our (South Africa’s) value lies 
in the fact that we are a truly African bid.  Morocco has a chance only because it is Europe’s 
African bid”. 
 
South Africa also had to tend to its image in Africa.  By this I refer to what was stated about 
the country’s commitment and authority in Africa being questioned by other African nations.  
Therefore, since Fifa 2010 had to be hosted in Africa, South Africa was presented with the 
opportunity to simultaneously show how ‘African’ it was to the Fifa governing body, while 
also reaffirming its African identity and commitment.  In other words, besides from 
appealing to the Fifa decision makers, South Africa also needed to enhance its soft power in 
Africa.   
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With the official launch of the bid in April 2003, then Sport Minister Ngconde Balfour said 
“the gathering set in motion a campaign that would resonate throughout the country and the 
entire continent” (Mail & Guardian, 30/04/2003).  At the launch, Irvin Khosa, the South 
African World Cup Bid Committee chairperson said that the event was “symbolic and 
functional” and that: “South Africans were faced with the challenge of ensuring the World 
Cup was made a memorable spectacle, since it would be the first time Africa would host the 
event” (Mail & Guardian, 30/04/2003).  Danny Jordaan, CEO of the SA Bid Committee (and 
the most prominent figure on the South African side) stated that: 
 
The award of the 2010 Fifa World Cup to South Africa will be the greatest gift to the people of 
our country and our continent.  A gift to all those who are struggling for peace, dignity and 
democracy anywhere in the world (Olajare, 2004).   
 
South Africa was thus clearly connected to the rest of Africa from the start and did not falter 
in constantly reaffirming its African identity.  The country had also played on its existing 
soft/symbolic power.  More specifically, South Africa reminded Africa and the rest of the 
world of the ‘African success story’.  These statements constantly referred to South Africa’s 
achievement of a peaceful transition to democracy, human rights, a written and enforced 
liberal constitution, freedom of speech and related aspects.  Interestingly, the South African 
2010 Bid Book (2003) even referred to the ‘negotiated revolution’ and quoted: 
 
The political and social miracle that transformed South Africa from an isolated, bitterly divided 
country on the brink of bloody civil war into a young democracy, a beacon of freedom, peace, 
hope and reconciliation, exhilarated millions around the world.  
 
But I would also argue that this had been an attempt to revive the existing, although fading 
memory of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ during the early 1990s.  At a time the entire world had been 
aware, and some had been in awe of South Africa’s transformation to democracy.  The 
country’s ‘glory’ was rapidly fading amongst other international problems namely the war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Thus, the bid campaign provided a forum from where the world could 
be reminded why they (should) have such a high regard for South Africa.  In doing so it was 
an attempt at reviving South Africa’s existing soft/symbolic power. 
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For instance, Thabo Mbeki said to Fifa’s executive committee “we held our third democratic 
general elections exactly a month ago.  In a real sense, these peaceful, free and fair elections 
were a referendum about our first 10 years of freedom, and a plebiscite to decide the agenda 
of our Second Decade of Liberation” (Mbeki, 2004).  Also, a few weeks before the 
announcement of the winning bid Nelson Mandela said “there could be few better gifts for us 
in this year of our celebration than to be awarded the 2010 soccer World Cup” (Jonker, 
2004).  The ‘year of celebration’ is of course signifying South Africa’s 10 years of 
democracy as clearly mentioned by Jordaan: “Fifa will name the winning country in the year 
that coincides with the 10th anniversary of full democracy in my country” (IOL, 2004).  
These three examples are representative of the basic tone of the South African side.  This 
definitely did not go unnoticed but had made an impression where it had been intended to, or 
at least with Fifa’s technical evaluation team.  Their report spoke of “the positive effect a 
World Cup would have on the nation-building process in a young democracy” (Gleeson, 
2004).   
South Africa’s emphasis on the country’s 10 years of democracy and related achievements  
was such a major feature in its bid that it infuriated the other bid contestants.  For example, 
Saad Kettani, head of Morocco’s bid was quite clear on the fact that he was not at all 
impressed with South Africa’s notion that they deserve the bid because of abolishing 
apartheid and achieving democracy.  He stated: “South Africa is the past.  Yet why should 
the rest of the world say, ‘lets keep all of Africa poor and give everything to South Africa?’”  
(ThisDay, 11/02/2004: 24).  His frustration signifies what an important boost being a 
democracy can be for a nation’s international image.  Because Morocco is a constitutional 
monarchy (UNDP, 2004), it is even more frustrating since it has nothing to offer in a race 
against a democracy in this regard.     
However, South Africa did not simply highlight its own achievements and successes, but 
went a step further and hinted that it is possible to achieve the same elsewhere on the 
continent.  This links up with South Africa’s attempt to project the image of being Africa’s 
benefactor – as the entire ‘African Renaissance’ concept is testimony of.  If we put South 
Africa’s self-interests aside for a moment, it could be argued that the ANC government’s 
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stated promise, “our only desire is to contribute to the great African story, to the well being 
of our continent” (Barber, 2004: 171), is evident from the country’s enormous involvement 
on the continent.  The most prominent examples being South Africa’s numerous multilateral 
involvements like the AU, Nepad, PAP, as well as its conflict resolution attempts and 
peacekeeping, as discussed in Chapter II.  Furthermore, the opportunity to mention South 
Africa’s involvement and developmental plans for Africa, like the African Renaissance, was 
never missed during media events.  
The image as the ‘benefactor of Africa’ was part of the South African side’s pitch right from 
the start of the campaign.  With the launching of the bid in April 2003, Irvin Khoza said: “I, 
as an African, want the World Cup to be hosted for the first time in 100 years in Africa.  It is 
in keeping with the ideals of the African Renaissance, the ideals President Thabo Mbeki and 
our government support” (Mail & Guardian, 30/04/2003).  As shown below, Mbeki never  
failed to mention the African Renaissance in combination with the World Cup bid.  
During the opening presentations to Fifa in September 2003, Mbeki stated: “The successful 
hosting of the Fifa World Cup in Africa will provide a powerful, irresistible momentum to 
this African renaissance” (Mail & Guardian, 01/10/2003).  Eight months later on May 14, 
2004, a day before the successful bid nation was chosen,   Mbeki referred to the ‘African 
Renaissance’ three times during his presentation speech to the Fifa Executive Committee 
(Mbeki, 2004).  
In the first instance he stated that Fifa’s decision to guarantee the World Cup to Africa was a 
sign that the organisation had shown to all Africans a commitment to support the African 
Renaissance.  More importantly, in the second and third instances Mbeki used the 
‘renaissance’ discourse in conjunction with South Africa’s 10 years of democracy and that all 
South Africans support the idea of an African Renaissance.  The point was repeated that 
South Africa’s third democratic elections was a mandate from the South African people “that 
they want to see a South Africa that has made decisive advances in the national effort to 
build a society of which all humanity would be proud.  They said they (South Africans) want 
to see an African continent that has taken a giant step forward towards its renaissance” 
(Mbeki, 2004).   
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Thus, the image projected was that the entire South African population consider themselves 
to be Africans.  The image was also created that the country’s entire population support the 
government’s initiatives to develop and uplift their fellow African brothers.  It can therefore 
be argued that the intention behind this had been that Africa should recognise and accept that 
South Africa’s authority and ideals on the continent was in their best interests, and that this 
was something that African nations must support. 
 
To conclude, the image South Africa had been sending to Africa and the world came across 
clearly.  In an interview with BBC Sport a day after South Africa won the bid, Fifa President, 
Sepp Blatter said:  
 
“To entrust South Africa to organise this World Cup is special because it is a country which has 
suffered.  The country came from the ashes but has now enjoyed 10 years of freedom and 
international connections in sport...with South Africa being a multi-cultural and multi-racial 
country, it is a dignified representative of Africa for the organisation of the World Cup” 
(Obayiuwana, 2004).  
 
Although South Africa did project an image of being a ‘dignified representative of Africa’, it 
also built forth on its image as being a ‘dignified representative of all’.  South Africa likes to 
be seen as the neutral and morally justified ‘bridge builder’ between North and South or 
between conflicting parties.  
3.3.3. Bridge Builder 
South Africa has a foot in each camp – one in the developing world and one in the developed 
world.  But this is by no means odd behaviour for a country such as South Africa.  In fact it is 
considered typical (emerging) middle power behaviour14.  It was stated in Chapter II that 
Cox (1997: xxvii and 1996:244) views the ‘middle’ in middle power as reference to 
“working in the middle towards cooperative internationalism”.  Also, emerging middle 
powers possess features of both worlds that enable them to understand the situation and 
                                                 
14 It was stated in Chapter 2 that Cox (1997: xxvii and 1996:244) views the ‘middle’ in middle power as 
reference to “working in the middle towards cooperative internationalism”.  It was also stated that the 
unique position and situation of emerging middle powers (i.e. possessing features of both worlds) enable 
them to understand the situation and views of both worlds, and therefore they can form a link between the 
two worlds 
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views of both worlds and therefore they can form a link between the two worlds.  In addition, 
South Africa has short and long-term interests that are directly affected by both worlds. 
 
As a result this geographic, material, political and symbolic position South Africa occupies 
between North and South, rich and poor, developed and developing has been dictating the 
country’s foreign policy since 1994.  Accordingly, South Africa likes to play the role of a 
representative for both the North and the South.  It is able to “understand and articulate the 
views of both sides in the world’s economic divide, between the developed North and the 
developing South” (Barber, 2004: 158).   
 
The ‘bridge builder’ image is also the second prominent image South Africa projected during 
the Fifa 2010 bid campaign.  In the previous discussions on the images South Africa 
projected, this issue was touched upon.  Here I would like to focus on how government and 
bid officials, as well as the media, reinforced and projected South Africa’s image and role as 
bridge builder.    
It has been noted in the press that South Africa’s bid had a subtle but clear political theme.  
Alfred (2004) described the theme as: “Africa, the basket case continent in the eyes of many, 
has the ability to host an international showpiece event”.   
Such a view is relevant when we consider certain given statements.  In April 2003 former 
Sport Minister Ngconde Balfour said that when the African host nation was announced “we 
will rise as one and together with the rest of Africa – our confidence in our people and 
continent will be vindicated” (Mail & Guardian, 30/04/2003).  
We should also consider the following statement by Mbeki (2004).  In a speech he delivered 
to the Fifa Executive Committee, and in reference to Fifa’s decision to guarantee that an 
African country will host the 2010 World Cup, he said: 
Through this decision, you conveyed the message to all Africans, both on the continent and the 
African Diaspora, that you are ready and willing to accompany us on our journey of hope, and 
give us the strength and stamina we need to traverse the difficult terrain that separates us from 
Africa's renaissance. 
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Thus, it can be said that South Africa’s projected image as a bridge builder showed two 
characteristics during the bid.  In the first place South Africa wanted to represent Africa as a 
continent that was capable of hosting a mega-event.  But this is not just any event.  It is 
considered to be of such a magnitude and on such a scale that it would require the kind of 
resources and skills that falls in the exclusive domain of Northern states.  
In the second place, South Africa acknowledged that Africa needs the support of other 
nations.  It then also appealed to the relevant nations to lend their support – be it financial or 
a show of faith.  When we look at South Africa’s other initiatives it is clear that this support 
is supposed to come from the North.  The image of a bridge builder is neatly summarised by 
Mbeki in a speech he delivered at a banquet in honour of German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder in January 2004.  Said Mbeki:  
I am very pleased that your visit to Africa includes a number of countries (including Ghana, 
Ethiopia and Kenya).  This is consistent with your concern to support our continent to meet its 
political economic and social goals, centred on the strengthening of democracy and the defeat 
of poverty and underdevelopment, and represented by the African Union and Nepad (New 
Partnership for Africa's Development) (Pressly, 2004).  
This visit by Schröder in January 2004 came at a time when the countdown to Fifa’s 
announcement of the 2010 host nation in May was gathering speed.  Schröder had also 
publicly stated his backing for the South African bid and in return, Mbeki thanked him for 
his support (Mokgola, 22/01/2004).  However, Schröder could not guarantee at that stage that 
Germany’s vote would go to South Africa since it was not his choice to make.  The decision 
resided with Germany’s soccer chiefs and specifically Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder.  
Nevertheless, this diplomatic show, wrapped in the context of the 2010 bid, was evidence of 
the bridge builder image South Africa has been actively attempting to enhance.  
Lastly, I would like to argue that South Africa’s conduct during the whole campaign 
resembled a country that wishes to enhance the ideas that it always takes the moral high 
ground, that the country can be trusted by all and that it is everyone’s ‘friend’.  If such 
behaviour is always upheld by South Africa is of course debatable.  What is important is that 
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these ideas were set forward by the South African side.  Such behaviour adequately served to 
support an image as a bridge builder.   
 
To corroborate, during the campaign South Africa never publicly launched an attack against 
the other bidding nations.  This is not to say that there weren’t more subtle ‘accusations’ 
from the South African side.  For instance, the Mail & Guardian (06/11/2003) noted that 
during the bid “South Africa’s superiority as a brand within Africa is promoted”.  The Bid 
Book highlighted certain South African features such as a ‘mature media environment’.  
Other African nations do not possess this feature.  Then again, the other bidding nations – 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – do not have most of the features South Africa has.  If 
South Africa mentions its democratic success the other are left out in the cold.  On the other 
hand these cannot be considered open and negative attacks and South Africa could still come 
of as morally intact. 
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the others.  Both Morocco and Egypt attacked 
South Africa’s image and bid.  Egypt, for example, accused the South African Parliamentary 
Speaker, Frene Ginwala, of making “hideous accusations” against the Fifa executive 
members (AllAfrica. 26/01/2004).  Allegedly Ginwala said that picking “the African 
Parliament is not like Fifa, which can be bought by money”.  By implication she accused Fifa 
of being corrupt.  Yet the statement made by Ginwala in January 2004, was completely taken 
out of context.  The Egyptian side later conceded to this and withdrew the accusation, but it 
was too late.  In addition, other African ministers pointed to South Africa as being 
“absolutely confident that it will host the World Cup because it bought the votes of 
members” (AllAfrica. 26/01/2004).   
The Moroccan side referred to South Africa’s high crime rate and HIV/Aids rate.  South 
Africa however did not respond, though definitely not due to a lack of negative material on 
Morocco.  There is the unresolved matter of Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara; bomb 
explosions in Casablanca in 2003; and Moroccan terrorist networks linked to the Madrid 
train-bombs in April 2004 (Cornish, 2004b: 14; The Economist, 10/04/2004: 22-23).  Danny 
Jordaan, CEO of SA Bid Committee simply stated that he and the rest of South Africa would 
not be drawn into “mudslinging tactics”:  
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The other bidding countries can do and say what they like.  South Africa will not stoop to any 
below-the-belt tactics or comments about other bidding countries’ campaigns.  We want to win 
this bid fairly and honestly and on our merits.  There will be no mud-slinging from our side 
(Cooper, 2004).  
It was also evident in the media that the South African side had succeeded in their attempt to 
portray the country as “morally honest”.  The Sunday Times reported that “honesty has been 
a touchstone of the South African bid from the beginning” (Alfred, 2004).  After South 
Africa was awarded the bid, Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils pointed out that it was – 
among other things – the country’s “moral high ground” that secured the bid (Alfred & 
Mkhize, 2004: 1).  
Ironically, in June 2004, shortly after Fifa announced that South Africa had won the bid, 
news of grand-scale corruption and match-fixing within the South African Football world 
emerged (Mokoena & Hadebe, 2004a).  Numerous coaches and referees were implicated and 
some arrested.  Of interest here is that police investigations have been conducted for months 
previously but arrests only followed after South Africa won the bid.  This could of course 
have been pure coincidence.  On the other hand it could also have been a deliberate attempt 
to keep South Africa’s image clean and honest as long as the country was more 
internationally visible that usual for the duration of the Fifa bid.  If Morocco and Egypt had 
learned of this during the campaign they would probably have created a lot of public 
awareness surrounding the issue.  
South Africa managed to avoid such an embarrassment and maintained the image as a 
morally intact bridge builder that every other state in the world could trust.  This level of 
commitment to maintaining the above image could also be found in South Africa’s portrayal 
of itself as the most efficient, capable and leading country on the continent.   
3.3.4. Efficient, Capable, Leading Country  
To put forth a bid, with the best possible chance of success, South Africa had to comply with 
Fifa’s strict technical requirements.  As can be expected, bid and government officials 
constantly made statements that reflected the country’s best features and accomplishments.  
This was done to reiterate its technological development, growing economy, sophisticated 
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infrastructure and the rest.  As stated in Chapter I, bidding for and hosting mega-events 
create opportunities to showcase a country’s new technologies, investment opportunities, and 
possible tourist destinations (Gratton & Taylor, 2000: 181; Roche, 2000: 10).  Therefore, by 
projecting an image of an efficient, capable and leading country during the bid, South Africa 
also implied that it has the ability to host a high-profile mega-event like a Soccer World Cup.  
Here too there was an opportunity to market the country to a wider audience than merely the 
Fifa delegations and inspectors.  Bidding for Fifa has been the perfect opportunity to project 
an image of having an ‘ability’ and ‘capability’ that stretches beyond simply playing host to a 
mega-event.   
 
In this instance I am specifically identifying the North as an extremely important ‘audience’ 
to this projected South African image.  By showcasing South Africa as an efficient, capable 
and leading country (as required of any potential World Cup host), South Africa was also 
projecting an image that would appeal to the North.  Why specifically the North?  On the 
face of it I would argue that in the case of South Africa the above named image is less 
important to project to Africa than it is to project to the North and non-African Southern 
states.  There are at least three main reasons for this.   
 
First, as shown by Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan (1998), Africa and specifically Southern 
Africa is well aware of South Africa’s capabilities, power and importance.  This is not 
necessarily the case with Northern countries.  Second, South Africa aims at inspiring investor 
confidence in itself and the continent.  It is from the Northern countries where the investment 
is supposed to come.  Thus, the North must constantly be made aware of South Africa’s 
position and efforts.  But South-South trade must also be inspired and South Africa must 
maintain its respected position in the eye of for instance, fellow IBSA members.  Third, 
South Africa enjoys preferential treatment from the North.  To maintain this South Africa 
must constantly show that it is still committed to its reforms, like neo-liberal economic 
policies and democratic practices, domestically as well as promoting it to the rest of Africa.  
As a result South Africa must then retain the North’s confidence in its leadership and 
authority in Africa.  This is exemplified by the country’s strong positions in organisations 
such as the AU, organs like the APSC and its leadership in initiatives such as Nepad.   
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South Africa already had an advantage in terms of its image as an efficient, capable and 
leading country at the start of the 2010 bid.  South Africa had hosted a number of other major 
games.  A few years previously South Africa had bid to host Fifa 2006 but lost to Germany 
by one vote.  Nevertheless, South Africa had beaten other major candidates like England.  
This had revealed that South Africa was capable of operating at ‘Northern levels’ so to speak.  
There was another advantage, as noted by Jordaan: “the sporting infrastructure of our country 
has already been rated as ‘ready to host the event’ by the 2006 Fifa Evaluation Team led by 
Alan I. Rothenberg”.  It was also made perfectly clear that South Africa already had 80 
percent of the needed infrastructure to host a World Cup (Mail & Guardian, 19/11/2003).  
It was not solely the country’s bid for 2006 that had to show that it was ready for 2010.  
South Africa also matched Fifa’s requirements for the 2010 bid – as was the case with the 
technical report.  This was an important aspect to project to the North.  As the 2010 bidding 
contest started to heat up in early in 2004, the South African side became extremely vocal 
about their highly developed economy, infrastructure and telecommunications capabilities.  
In February 2004 Jordaan stated:  
We are not saying you just have to give us the World Cup because of this and that, or because 
we came so close the last time.  We are saying that South Africa is the most qualified of the 
bidding nations and it is very clear.  We have surpassed the Fifa requirements.  We have met 
every standard set by the world body for football...we have the facilities: hotels, telecom 
facilities, stadia requirements, road network, transport system, strong currency and the 
economy to support a venture like this.  The government is in full support.  What else is 
required?  (Olajare, 2004).  
South Africa’s image of maintaining high standards in the above-named features received 
another boost in May 2004 when Fifa decided to release the technical report on all the 
contestants.  The reason for this was that South Africa’s technical report placed it head and 
shoulders above the other competitors.  The widely publicised report also stated that South 
Africa was the most viable candidate to host the World Cup.  The South African side 
probably had not expected this, but they could definitely exploit it.  It contributed to the 
country’s image as an efficient, capable, attractive and growing international actor, a country 
with which the North would want to deal, business wise and politically.  It is clear that the 
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South African side placed the country’s commercial possibilities in just such a context.  The 
SA 2010 Bid Book (2003), presented to Fifa on 1 October 2003, as well as the official bid 
website portrayed it as follows: 
Our economic status is clear and stable and our prospects are excellent; so, many Fifa sponsors 
continue to invest heavily in South Africa.  Furthermore, our stadiums and transport network, 
our cutting edge IT framework, our technology and communications systems, our hotels and 
accommodation capacity, our human administration skills and our marketing ability: in all these 
areas, South Africa can compare with any in Africa, indeed any in the world;  
And then, the real crowd pleaser:  
Maybe the strongest dimension of this bid, the compelling reason why South Africa is ready, is 
to be found in our commercial maturity, physical infrastructure and human skills.  Yes, we have 
the will.  We also have the tools. 
Building forth on the 2010 Bid Book’s content Jordaan stated “our bid is based on 
internationally-established business principles and is substantially funded by leading 
multinational companies” (Olajare, 2004).  Consequently both the Bid Book and Jordaan 
drew attention to the involvement of multinational companies in the bid and to South 
Africa’s internationally-established business principles.  
There is arguably no better way to project a business-friendly image than to show that 
multinationals and others in the private sector have been eager to invest in South Africa and 
the World Cup.  Therefore right from the start, government and bid officials continuously 
urged the private sector to invest in the World Cup.  For example, during the high profile 
Presidential Awards in March 2003, President Mbeki pleaded with the corporate world to 
support the bid (Mail & Guardian, 30/04/2003).   
However, many multinationals were supporting the bid from its early stages.  In April 2003 
SuperSport sport channel provided R10-million for the campaign.  Jordaan described it as a 
“booster rocket” for the South African campaign (Mail & Guardian, 30/04/2003).  In 
September 2003 SABMiller made a sponsorship of R12-million (Mail & Guardian, 
11/09/2003).  By May 2004 many more were already involved.  Under these were counted 
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BMW, Adidas, South African Airways, Anglo American, Momentum Life, Philips, Southern 
Sun and First National Bank (Sunday Times, 09/05/2004a: 22).  Others waited to see if South 
Africa’s bid was successful or not.  Some did commit themselves to sponsorships provided 
that the South African bid was successful.  For instance, Adidas, Coca-Cola and Philips had 
confirmed interests of R326-million; Anglo American, SABMiller, BMW and Vodacom 
pledged R435-million; MasterCard, McDonald’s and Yahoo! had a promised R204-million 
(Sunday Times, 09/05/2004a). 
Bid officials, politicians and business people also made sure that new pledges, sponsorships, 
and investments received huge media coverage.  Towards the end of the campaign the bid 
company announced that it had secured 42% of its targeted R2312- million from big-name 
multinationals.  Such behaviour by the multinationals sends the message that they are 
confidant that South Africa is able to host a mega-event of World Cup proportions.  This 
should appeal to Northern interests.  But if Northern business interests wondered where the 
South African government was in all of this they did not need to look further than the Fifa 
‘List of Requirements’. 
The entire Fifa bid was marked by the complete support from the South African government 
(Neveling, 2004:21).  The most credible example of this was probably the declaration of 
guarantees submitted to Fifa.  These guarantees came from various relevant government 
authorities and Ministers in answer to the List of Requirements issued by Fifa (SA 2010 Bid 
Book, 2003).  It also stated that: “The Government shall ensure that all special laws, 
regulations and decrees necessary to establish the conditions required for organising and 
staging the 2010 Fifa World Cup are enacted and enforced.”     
 
Besides highlighting multinational involvement and total support from government, South 
Africa had additional resources at its disposal.  The Bid Company made sure that the entire 
South African campaign was practically flawless, at least as far as was publicly visible.  
Doubtless this must have projected a general image of a country with organised, capable and 
confident people, businesses and practices.   
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When the Fifa delegates visited the country on their routine inspections they had nothing but 
the highest praise for the South African effort (Mail & Guardian, 06/11/2003).  Besides first 
class treatment, they were also addressed and accompanied by various political figures, 
cabinet ministers, and business people (Gleeson, 2004:21).  The importance of incorporating 
the South African media during this time was invaluable.  It mobilised public support for the 
bid and was something the Fifa delegates encountered wherever they went in South Africa.  
The general image projected was that the South African bid was supported from the 
grassroots level right through to government.  South Africa’s 2010 Bid Book also 
proclaimed:  
In every city, town and district, in every gleaming office block and dusty settlement, South 
Africans truly believe our country can host a magnificent Fifa World Cup in 2010.  This 
popular support is broad and deep, and strengthens our mission.  
This was a very different situation than during the South African bid to host the 2004 
Olympic Games.  Here a great part of the population was against such an undertaking.  Also, 
Cornelissen (2004b: 1297) argued that, as opposed to the 2004 bid that was regarded as a 
‘white’ bid, the 2010 bid was seen as a ‘black’ bid.  Accordingly a greater numbers of the 
population was included.  It could be indicating that the South African population has bought 
the government’s promotion of the potential benefits associated with hosting mega sporting 
events.  
Whatever the case may be, the importance of mass-scale public support becomes apparent 
when looking at the impact a lack of such support had for the credibility and competency of 
the other African candidates.  The Tunisian campaign was criticised for a low level of public 
interest.  When the Fifa delegates inspected Tunisia it was even reported that a large number 
of Tunisians were not even aware that their country was in the race to host the World Cup.  
Also, in contrast to the South African bid, Tunisia’s bid was criticised for its lack of a 
“punchy theme” and a clear figurehead to lead the bid (Mokoena, 01/02/2004).  The theme 
went something along the line of ‘Roman remains, modern sophistication, yet totally 
Tunisian’ (Tunisia2010, 2003), compared to South Africa’s more successful focus on 
‘Africa’s World Cup’ and ‘Africa’s time has come’.   
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In Morocco’s case, it was widely noted in the press that the country’s football federation was 
hardly involved.  They predominantly relied on foreign consultants (Gleeson, 2004: 19).  
Therefore, Morocco’s bid sent out an image (most likely unintentionally) that the country 
lacked local skilled and competent people.  Besides the negative reflection of this on the bid, 
it could also prove harmful to other potential foreign business interests beside the World 
Cup.   
South Africa’s last attempt and opportunity to boost its bid was the delegation it sent to 
Zurich for the final announcement of who would host the 2010 World Cup.  It was an 
important last opportunity for signalling South Africa’s stature to the international 
community – at least as far as the bid was concerned.  If anything, the South African 
delegation was a perfect example of how the country’s entire bid had been conducted: an 
‘over -the top’ display and reminder to Fifa and millions of people watching the proceedings 
of basically everything the country has achieved during the last 10 years.   
All the South African bid officials were of course included in the delegation.  President 
Thabo Mbeki also addressed Fifa in Zurich, preceding the announcement.  This still showed 
that South Africa connected the importance of leadership and government backing to the Fifa 
bid and sent this image into the world.  This was a significant message and one that the other 
bidding nations completely missed.  No other African head of state accompanied their 
delegations.  Further political representation in the delegation was in the form of some 
ministers.  Amongst them the former Minister of Sport, Ngconde Balfour and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was counted.  On the economic side, South 
Africa was represented by numerous prominent black empowerment businessmen 
(Matshikiza, 2004: 37).  Rumour even had it that Charlize Theron, who had won the Oscar 
for Best Actress a few months before the announcement, would join the delegation (Sunday 
Times, 09/05/2004b).  This did not happen but had surely created more publicity for the bid.  
Nevertheless, it was probably the people in the delegation with ‘symbolic’ significance that 
came over the strongest.  For this final reminder of the ‘African success story’ the delegation 
included South African Nobel Peace Price winners Nelson Mandela, Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu and F.W. De Klerk.  They are possibly the most public individuals involved in South 
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Africa’s peaceful democratic transformation.  This ‘symbolic significance’ is nothing less 
that the exact soft power that has supported South Africa’s moral authority and emerging 
middle power behaviour since 1994.  
Once again the importance of soft/symbolic power becomes apparent when it is compared to 
the other bids.  Neither Egypt nor Morocco made proper use of their rich and millennia-old 
heritage to portray a stronger image of their nations and to secure the bid.  Therefore they 
never employed the full potential of their soft power and furthermore did nothing to improve 
it either.  Matshikiza (2004: 37) said that “the North Africans could still have put themselves 
in there with a fighting chance if they could have bothered to try”.  He mentioned the late 
Moroccan King Hussan II – that claimed direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad – and 
Egypt’s Pharaohs, pyramids and the rest that could have been emphasised and used to signify 
the countries’ soft/symbolic power.  The same way South Africa used ‘Madiba Magic’, Tutu 
and De Klerk.   
South Africa’s image to the North and the world during the entire campaign was that of a 
competent, committed and attractive leader.  Furthermore, it was also the intention to show 
that the South African government and business sectors are committed and more than 
capable to host the World Cup, and that South Africa in general has a stable and attractive 
business environment even major multinationals recognise as a worthwhile investment 
destination.       
3.4. CONCLUSION 
The preceding assessment of the South African bid for Fifa 2010 was done to show that the 
country was actively seeking ways to boost its soft power.  It became clear that such an 
attempt involved the projection of certain chosen images to the rest of the international 
community.  It is also clear that the projected images were to a large extent in line with the 
roles the country already assumed in its post-apartheid era (i.e. its emerging middle power 
behaviour).  These images then also supported the country’s foreign policy objectives.   
 
As was show, the images were also intended to reflect favourably on South Africa in the eyes 
of both the Northern and Southern countries, be it to rally support for future initiatives and 
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leadership positions South Africa may want to pursue or, in support of existing initiative, 
roles and relationships.    
 
Earlier in this study it was stated that for a nation to achieve desired outcomes, less direct 
ways of exerting power also exist.  The idea is to get other states to “want what you want” as 
opposed to simply get them to “do as you want.”  It was furthermore stated that the ability to 
receive such voluntary cooperation and interest in ones country has to do with how well a 
state can manage and make use of its soft power.  Therefore a country’s culture, ideology, 
norms and foreign policy must be more than merely acceptable to other states – it must be 
attractive.   
 
Thus, based on the statements and behaviours of the bid and government officials during the 
bid, as well as the images they chose to project, I would argue that the bid was deliberately 
used in an attempt to enhance the country’s soft power.  South Africa’s winning bid could 
even affirm that the country was able to successfully deploy its soft power.    
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
4.1. CONCLUSION 
It was stated that because the international system is increasingly becoming more complex, 
the resources that generate power have become much more complex.  Therefore, states 
continuously search for new power resources and better power conversion becomes crucial.  
This has caused that less prominent, intangible and new power resources are gaining greater 
interest from states and therefore also recognition from international relations analysts.  This 
study dealt with soft or symbolic or co-optive power as potential, intangible powers and 
power resources.  It was also attempted to show how South Africa was actively trying to 
boost its soft power by making use of the Fifa 2010 World Cup bid as a marketing platform 
for the country.  The importance for a study like this becomes apparent when considering the 
country’s growing involvement in bidding and hosting such events and its centrality to 
foreign policy.   
 
The necessary approach required the investigation of South Africa’s regional and global 
position and role.  It was also necessary to assess exactly what South Africa’s soft power 
entails and why it is important to the country’s particular situation.  This was then applied to 
the South African bid for the 2010 World Cup where the focus moved to how the country’s 
bid and government officials attempted to enhance South Africa’s soft power.      
*** 
It became apparent that South Africa’s global position and role is without a doubt that of a 
middle power, more specifically an emerging middle power.  This was derived from 
qualifying the country according to existing criteria ascribed to emerging middle powers.  It 
was shown how the country’s emerging middle power role manifests in its dealing with the 
North and with Africa and the South.  The discussion pointed out that South Africa is 
constantly and enthusiastically building its emerging middle power role in order to expand 
upon it, but also to sustain its authority, legitimacy and credibility.  Not only is this to be 
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expected but it is also a necessity for maintaining the country’s long-term self-interests and 
goals, initiatives and leadership in the region, continent and possibly also on a global level.   
 
In relation to Africa and most others in the developing world, it is possible for South Africa 
to employ certain amounts of relational power.  Soft power is however still crucial, especially 
to ensure voluntary cooperation for South African initiatives and to ensure that its authority is 
perceived as legitimate.  At the global level, South Africa’s relational power is insignificant 
and the country is basically left with its soft or symbolic power.  Soft power is thus important 
in dealing with the North as well as the South.  But it is becoming more difficult to maintain 
its soft power as time passes.  As was shown, after 1994 the New South Africa had great 
moral authority and tremendous symbolic power that helped in supporting the actions and 
initiatives the country took or pursued.  This symbolic power is the basis for, or rather, it is 
the soft power with which this study is concerned.  South Africa’s soft power ensured that it 
received unprecedented inclusion and voluntary cooperation from the international 
community – both North and South.  However, South Africa has to continually maintain and 
expand its soft power.  
 
There are numerous reasons for this.  The ones I identified in 3.2.1., and that are most 
relevant to this study include firstly, that South Africa’s ‘flavour of the month’ status is 
fading.  The world has developed new problems and causes and therefore also new victims, 
heroes and villains that step to the fore during the past ten years since South Africa achieved 
democracy.  Second, South Africa’s growing prestige and power in Africa poses a potential 
threat to fellow African countries.  Also, South Africa’s relationships with the North 
(unequalled by any other the North may have with an African state) create feelings of 
resentment and doubt in regards to where South Africa’s loyalty and commitment lies.  This 
also creates problems for South Africa’s ‘African Identity’.  Africa’s questioning of South 
Africa’s commitment to the continent’s development are further enhanced by the country’s 
relationship and dealings with other Southern states and emerging middle powers that are not 
located on the African continent.  Thirdly, there are American-led lurches towards growing 
unilateralism and decreasing multilateralism in the international system (Bischoff, 2003: 
186).  This is rather significant for South Africa since the country predominantly relies on 
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multilateralism for its manoeuvring and partly to gain greater legitimacy.  Lastly, South 
Africa’s reformist agendas (2.3.1 & 2.3.2.), if pushed too far or to the point where it threatens 
the interests of the dominant Northern powers, may experience a backlash from the North.  
This could have the effect that South Africa loses the preferential treatment and support it 
currently enjoys from the North.  The consequences of this could also affect South Africa’s 
position and leadership in Africa and the South.    
 
It is therefore apparent that South Africa has a significant interest in maintaining and 
enhancing its soft power.  This is also exactly what was done during the Fifa 2010 bid.  In the 
past, South Africa pursued and hosted numerous mega-events.  These included summits and 
conferences like the World Summit on Sustainable Development, and mega sports events 
such as the 1995 Rugby World Cup.  Though, never before did South Africa host an event by 
the scale of the Soccer World Cup.  The bidding campaign for this event provided 
unprecedented opportunities for marketing any desired image and aspects regarding one’s 
country.  These opportunities will of course increase substantially when the actual event is 
taking place.     
 
Therefore South Africa pursued the 2004 Olympic Games and the 2006 Soccer World Cup of 
which both bids turned out to be unsuccessful.  Nevertheless, South Africa followed-up these 
bids with the 2010 World Cup bid, with even more vigour than before.  This time the bid was 
successful and it too presented a forum from where to market the country.  It was noted that 
South Africa attempted to enhance its soft power by projecting certain images of the country 
to the world at the same time as the main 2010 campaign was conducted.  These images were 
intended to create favourable images of South Africa to the intended audiences.  The three 
main projected images were identified as firstly, African Identity/Africa’s Benefactor; 
secondly, Bridge Builder and thirdly, Efficient, Capable, Leading Country. 
Accordingly, South Africa projected to Africa that the country is indeed ‘African’ and that 
the entire South African population – black and white – consider themselves African.  The 
South African government also reaffirmed its support and commitment to initiatives and 
promises aimed at uplifting Africa.  South Africa’s message to the North and other non-
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African Southern states was equally clear.  South Africa portrayed itself as a competent, 
committed and attractive leader in Africa – a country that abides by international (Western) 
economic and political standards.  
In other words, South Africa attempted to show that it is the personification of the West’s 
democratic, open-market model it envisions and promotes everywhere in the world, a country 
with a stable and attractive business environment that even major multinationals have faith 
in.  Lastly, to the world in general, South Africa reaffirmed its neutral position as 
intermediary between North and South and between conflicting parties.  But it did more than 
that.  By projecting South Africa as an honest and neutral moral authority it also supported 
the country’s image as a mediator and peace broker.  Thus, South Africa emerged as the 
bridge builder that every other state in the world should trust.     
It became apparent how South Africa’s emerging middle power position, foreign policy, soft 
power, and bid to host the Fifa 2010 World Cup tie into each other.  In turn, a significant 
amount of the country’s soft/symbolic power came as a result of its foreign policy (emphasis 
on, for instance, human rights and global economic reform) and emerging middle power 
characteristics (bridge builder, regional leader, and reformer).    
 
Thus, because South Africa wanted to boost its soft power during the Fifa 2010, the images it 
chose to project are a reflection of the country’s emerging middle power position and foreign 
policy of the day.  All of these combined are supposed to support South Africa’s long term 
goals and self-interests.  This may even be more important in South Africa’s dealings with 
Africa than with the North.  
 
In the region and on the continent South Africa’s hard power has gone from strength to 
strength.  So much so that it is often perceived as a threat by fellow African states (3.2.1.).  
As was noted in the 2010 bid campaign, there is a general feeling of resentment growing in 
Africa against South Africa.  This is where the importance of South Africa’s soft power 
becomes clear.  It has the potential to supply the country with a more attractive image on the 
continent.  It could also legitimise its authority and leadership.  In doing so South Africa can 
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achieve the voluntary cooperation is so desperately needs.  As a result it is crucial to 
constantly maintain and expand its soft power.   
4.2. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In 2010 South Africa will host the World Cup.  If nothing else it can be expected that this 
event will play host to the largest ever marketing campaign undertaken by the government.  
Furthermore, the event is also guaranteed to draw the biggest in the corporate world because 
there is money to be made and because of the tremendous and diverse audience soccer has.  It 
will furthermore be interesting to note to what extent domestic and foreign corporate sectors 
bought into the government’s portrayal of South Africa.  Also, how much alike is the images 
of South Africa that the corporate players reflect in their advertising, to those that the South 
African government project?   
 
Probably the more important aspect to investigate is how Pretoria will market itself during 
the actual 2010 Games.  What images will the government project?  To what extent will it 
reflect the images that were identified in the bid campaign?  Will the projected images in six 
years time still support and reflect the country’s foreign policy, while playing heavily on soft 
power?  Lastly, this study’s concept of soft power is also worthy of further investigation.  For 
example, is the significance of soft power gaining ground against states’ preference for more 
traditional and tangible power resources?  This is especially significant since it may be 
argued that the behaviour of the superpower of the day shows exactly the opposite.  
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